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Abstract
This article reflects on the proliferation of responses to the so-called phenomenon of 
“foreign terrorist fighters,” and the profound human rights challenges they give rise to. 
It considers national, regional and international developments, many spurred by an 
activist Security Council, through which expanded powers have been assumed and 
rights restricted by reference to the need to respond to ftf threats. A series of un-
comfortable relationships emerge from this analysis. They include for example 
 tensions: between the evolving and still relatively superficial understanding of the 
nature and source of uncertain threats and contributing factors on the one hand, and 
the onerous and far-reaching nature of responses directed against them on the other; 
between the expansive use of coercive measures including criminal law, and basic 
constraining principles of criminal law upon which its legitimacy and power de-
pends, such as individual culpability, harm principle and remoteness; or between the 
original purposes of most ftf measures and their impact in practice, on the opera-
tion of humanitarian law, on humanitarian workers and human rights defenders, and 
on the rule of law. Exceptional ftf measures continue to spread their reach and 
creep into other areas of security and organised crime. The article highlights the need 
to consider the short and long term impact, on the full range of rights of many, of the 
array of administrative, criminal and other measures being passed into law and im-
plemented in practice across the globe in the name of responding to the ill-defined 
phenomenon of “ftfs”.
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1 Introduction
It is often noted that the phenomenon of travel to support foreign fighting is not 
new,1 but the extent and nature of responses on the national and international 
levels in recent years certainly are. In the past five years, the influx of what have 
(controversially) come to be referred to as “foreign terrorist fighters”2 (ftfs) to 
Iraq, Syria and other states, and in particular their return home or movement 
on to third states, has been the subject of intense international attention, spur-
ring prolific developments in law, policy and practice across the globe.
A defining contributor to this process has been the United Nations Security 
Council (unsc). Successive resolutions, several adopted under Chapter vii of 
the UN Charter, determined that the flow of ftfs constituted an “international 
threat to peace and security.”3 Resolution 2178 of 2014 obliged states to take 
wide-reaching measures to prevent, disrupt, prosecute and suppress the travel 
1 See, eg. M. Flores, “Foreign Fighters Involvement in National and International Wars: A 
 Historical Survey”, in Andrea de Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen (eds.), 
Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond (The Hague: t.m.c. Asser Press, 2016), 
pp. 27–48 (hereafter ffilb). See also: D. Malet, “The European Experience with Foreign 
Fighters and Returnees”, in T. Renard and R. Coolsaet (eds.), “Returnees: who are they, why 
are they (not) coming back and how should we deal with them? Assessing policies on return-
ing foreign terrorist fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands”, Egmont Institute, 
Brussels, February 2018, pp. 7–9.
2 For the controversies relating to the term, and associated human rights issues, see section 3. 
unsc Resolution 2178, 24 September 2014 (UN Doc. S/RES/2178 (2014)), describes ftfs as 
“individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the 
purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or 
the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict”. 
Although, as noted below, the ftf term is problematic for its breadth and vagueness and the 
ensuing rights implications, it is the term most commonly used in the international arena 
and the one therefore used in this paper. Some research on the topic continues to refer to 
“foreign fighters”.
3 See unsc Resolution 2178 (2014), preceded by unsc Resolution 2170 (UN Doc. S/RES/2170 
(2014)), of 15 August 2014 para 8, which called upon states to suppress the flow of ftfs to the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (isil) Al Nusrah Front (anf) and all other entities as-
sociated with Al-Qaida, and to bring ftfs to justice.
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and return of ftfs, targeting inter alia recruitment, organization, transporta-
tion, training, financing, and various other forms of facilitation or support for 
ftfs.4 It also called on states to promote tolerance, rehabilitation and the 
 prevention of “radicalization to terrorism [and] violent extremism.” Subse-
quent unsc Resolution 2396 (2017) broadened out further the obligations in 
relation to criminal justice, border security, and cooperation, including the 
creation of “watch lists or databases” of suspect persons and information shar-
ing between states.5 In 2019, further resolutions sought to enhance the prose-
cution of “direct and indirect” forms of support or services to terrorist groups, 
and to “intensify and accelerate” access to – and inter-state sharing of – 
 intelligence, including from the private sector.6 This Security Council activity 
has unleashed a normative flood that continues to pour downwards and spill 
outwards, manifesting itself in new regional and national developments 
against an ever-broadening range of targets.7
States around the globe have changed legislation, developed policy and in-
troduced practices with wide-reaching human rights implications. Among 
these practices are an array of ‘administrative’ measures, such as citizenship 
stripping, deportation, travel bans, blocking entry into or transit through ter-
ritories, removal of travel documents, house arrest, control orders and freezing 
of assets among others. Also prevalent is the expanded criminalization of 
 travel-related activity or its “facilitation” or “justification”. Both are supported 
by an increase in the use of surveillance, special investigative techniques, 
watch lists and databases, and the monitoring and blocking of websites that 
for example support ftf laws and policies.8
4 Preamble to unsc Resolution 2178 (2014), para. 4, calls on states “to cooperate in efforts to ad-
dress the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including by preventing the  radicalization 
to terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, including children, preventing 
 foreign terrorist fighters from crossing their borders, disrupting and preventing financial sup-
port to foreign terrorist fighters, and developing and implementing prosecution, rehabilita-
tion and reintegration strategies for returning foreign terrorist fighters.”
5 unsc Resolution 2396 (2017), adopted on 21 December 2017, UN Doc. S/RES/2396.
6 unsc Resolution 2482 (2019) and 2462 (2019); the latter provides for states to ensure “that 
their domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses … the wilful provision 
or collection of funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related 
services, directly or indirectly, with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used for the benefit of terrorist organizations or individual 
terrorists for any purpose, including but not limited to recruitment, training, or travel, even 
in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act;”.
7 see eg EU Directive 2017/541 on Combatting Terrorism, 15 March 2017.
8 For an overview of measures applied in selected countries, see eg,: “Returning foreign terror-
ist fighters in Europe: A comparative analysis”, October 2017, <http://mastereurope.eu/wp 
-content/uploads/2017/10/Returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-Europe-.pdf>; “The  return
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As the SC resolutions that prompted much of this activity themselves ex-
plicitly acknowledge, states are obliged to adopt counter-terrorism measures 
consistently with their obligations under international human rights law 
(ihrl), international humanitarian law (ihl) and refugee law.9 Recognition of 
the interconnectedness and co-dependency of protecting human rights and 
security is now commonplace, not only in Security Council resolutions but 
across the board of international instruments, unga resolutions and regional 
commitments.10 Likewise, that an effective counter-terrorism policy needs to 
address the “conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism” including rights 
violations, injustice and inequality, is amply reflected across international 
counter-terrorism initiatives in the last decade, with the UN Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy as the centrepiece.11
What emerges, however, is a substantial gap between theory and unfolding 
practice. Even the language of the Security Council resolutions, not to mention 
their implementation by states, raise profound and wide-reaching human 
rights and rule of law concerns. This has led to unusually strident criticism of 
the Security Council for paying mere ‘lip service’ to human rights.12 It has also 
prompted questions as to how can and should states meet the genuine security 
challenges that arise from the movement of so-called ftfs, while making real 
on the commitment to human rights and rule of law? What does a human 
rights approach look like, and how can we ensure that ftf measures make a 
genuine contribution to addressing, not fuelling, the problem?
 of foreign fighters to EU soil: Ex-post evaluation”, European Parliamentary Research 
 Service  15  May 2018, <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/
EPRS_STU(2018)621811_EN.pdf>, (hereafter, “The return of foreign fighters to EU soil. Ex-
post  evaluation”, European Parliamentary Research Service); B. van Ginkel and E. Enten-
mann (eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union”.
9 Unlike eg SCRes 1373 post 9/11, it must be recognized that the ftf resolutions are explicit 
in this respect.
10 Eg EU Directive on Combatting Terrorism, recital 35. See: “Chairmanship’s Perception Pa-
per: Recommendations from the 2018 osce-wide Counter-Terrorism Conference on ‘The 
Reverse Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (ftfs): Challenges for the osce Area and 
 Beyond’, Rome, 10–11 May 2018”, Italian osce Chairmanship, cio.GAL/90/18, 20 July 2018, 
p.  5, (hereafter, Chairmanship’s Perception Paper on the 2018 osce-wide Counter- 
Terrorism Conference).
11 The osce Ministerial Declaration on human rights concerns fomenting the spread of vio-
lent extremism.
12 Eg. F. Ní Aoláin, (current UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism), “The UN Security 
Council, Global Watch Lists, Biometrics and the threat to the rule of law”, Just Security, 17 
January 2018, <www.justsecurity.org/51075/security-council-global-watch-lists-biomet-
rics/>, (hereafter, F. Ní Aoláin, “The UN Security Council, Global Watch Lists, Biometrics 
and the threat to the rule of law”).
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In the past few years various initiatives have emerged in an effort to con-
sider these questions, address the human rights implications of developments 
thus far, and offer recommendations on a more human rights compliant ap-
proach. One of these was a report drafted by this author under the auspices of 
the osce (odihr), which sought to provide support and guidance, from a 
 human rights perspective, to osce participating States on responding to ftf-
related threats and challenges in a manner consist with their international ob-
ligations.13 Neither that report, still less this summary of issues arising from 
that project, purport to be definitive guides to human rights compliance in this 
complex field. They are, however, part of a growing conversation14 between 
state and non-governmental actors on how to develop comprehensive, coher-
ent and human rights compliant responses in practice.15 What follows are a 
few reflections, on what, in the author’s view, a human rights approach to the 
issue involves and some of the key challenges.
2 A Human Rights Approach?
2.1 Understanding Threats to Effectively Address Evolving Problems
Any effective strategy to address a problem must be predicated on a clear un-
derstanding of it. Moreover, legal requirements such as the necessity and pro-
portionality of restrictions on rights highlighted in the next section, are depen-
dent on an understanding of the problem or threat, and the anticipated 
effectiveness of particular measures of response. Understanding the true 
threat ftf-related travel represents and why, the motivation of those engaged 
in it, the role of various forms of support, are therefore essential and among 
the necessary pre-requisites to a tailored, effective rule of law approach. Our 
collective understanding of ftf-activity, its drivers, causes and contributors, is 
however very much in flux. The evidence emerging from a growing (but still 
13 Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” 
within a Human Rights Framework, odihr (2018) at https://www.osce.org/odihr/393503? 
download=true.
14 It forms part of an increased amount of attention from important sources, within the 
uncted, the Special Rapporteur on terrorism and human rights, ngos and others, which 
reveals the profound human rights and rule of law implications of current trends and the 
urgency of changing course.
15 “Ministerial Statement on Supporting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strat-
egy”, osce, MC.DOC/3/07, 3 December 2007, para. 22, (hereafter, osce Ministerial State-
ment on Supporting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy).
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limited) body of research and literature is however instructive and not always 
reflected in international and national responses.
2.1.1 Evolving Global Flow, and Uncertain Threats
The FTF phenomenon, like terrorism itself, is a long-standing and a global phe-
nomenon. Specifically, the tens of thousands of people who travelled to Iraq, 
Syria and other countries in the past few years16 came from a geographic spread 
of around 110 states.17 The travelers from and back to European states generat-
ed the vast majority of international attention but represent a relatively small 
piece of the picture.18 The nature of the flow is also constantly evolving and 
uncertain. It is clear that for a range of reasons,19 travel to those states that 
prompted the initial ftf resolutions has diminished in the past couple of 
years, while return or “reverse flow” of ftfs and their families has taken place 
in waves. Reliable statistics are, again, elusive, but in the European Union (EU) 
it has been suggested that some 30 per cent had returned or moved to other 
16 These other states include Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Pakistan and Somalia.
17 While estimates are by their very nature unreliable, linked in part to definitional prob-
lems, it has been suggested that more than 40,000 foreign terrorist fighters had travelled 
to just Iraq and Syria alone as of late 2017 See: “Greater Cooperation Needed to Tackle 
Danger Posed by Returning Foreign Fighters, Head of Counter-Terrorism Office Tells Secu-
rity Council”, United Nations, 29 November 2017, <www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13097.
doc.htm>.
18 <www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/europol_tesat_2016.pdf>. 
Europol writes that “More than 5,000 Europeans are believed to have travelled to conflict 
areas in Syria and Iraq”. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (icct) cited the 
number of between 3,922 and 4,294, hence on average 4,108. See: B. van Ginkel and E. 
Entenmann (eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, 
Threats & Policies”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, April 2016, p. 4, <www 
.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-
the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf> (hereafter, B. van Ginkel and E. Enten-
mann (eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union”). Tunisia is be-
lieved to be the largest source state, with 6,000 persons estimated to have travelled to the 
conflict in Syria from that state alone. See: “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of 
the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq”, the Soufan Group, December 2015, p. 15, 
<soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf>.
19 These may include attacks on isis and widely reported shrinking space, among several 
others: “The Challenge of Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research 
Perspectives”, UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (uncted), March 
2018 (hereafter, uncted Trends Report 2018), <www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/04/CTED-Trends-Report-March-2018.pdf>. The current wave of returning ftfs up to 
2018 is described as larger and more diverse than previous ones.
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states by 2016, most of whom had spent relatively short periods of time 
abroad,20 while a larger and more diverse wave developed of returness oc-
curred during 2017–18 corresponding with the “shrinking territories” in Syria 
and collapse of the so-called “Islamic State” caliphate in Iraq. Many others re-
main unaccounted for, while an uncertain number of thousands of people in-
cluding children are held indefinitely in camps described as breeding grounds 
for violent extremism.21
Within this landscape, concerns that isil is intent on using returning ftfs 
has been a defining feature of the political discourse and related developments 
in law and policy. The threat this poses is also inherently difficult to quantify. 
The widely reported involvement of several former ftfs in some European 
 attacks appeared to confirm fears.22 On the other hand, some commentators 
have called for some perspective on the relatively very small number of ftfs 
who have engaged in terrorism upon their return.23 Experience has shown that 
threats and attacks much more commonly emerge without any “foreign” 
engagement.24
20 Reliable statistics are elusive, but in the European Union (EU) it has been suggested that 
some 30 per cent had already returned or moved to other states by 2016. B. van Ginkel and 
E. Entenmann (eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union”.
21 See, for example, uncted Trends Report 2018, “Risk Analysis 2017”, Frontex, 20 February 
2018, pp. 30–31, <frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk 
_Analysis_2017.pdf>, (hereafter, “Risk Analysis 2017”, Frontex); “Now that the Islamic State 
has fallen in Iraq and Syria, where are all its fighters going”, the Washington Post, 22 Febru-
ary 2018, <www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters>; D.L. 
Byman, “Frustrated Foreign Fighters”, the Brookings Institution, 13 July 2017, <www.brook 
ings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/13/frustrated-foreign-fighters/>.
22 See: uncted Trends Report 2018; Hegghammer, “Should I stay or Should I Go? Explaining 
Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting”, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No. 1, (February 2013), p. 11.
23 See, for example, C. Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalization or Reintegra-
tion?”, the Brookings Institution, August 2015, p. 2, <www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/06/En-Fighters-Web.pdf>, which notes: “While genuine, the potential 
threat posed by returning FFs should not be overly exaggerated. Statistical analyses based 
on historical data … have suggested that no more than 11 percent of FFs will pose a terror-
ist threat upon their return home”.
24 For example, see the statement by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in 2016 not-
ing that it would be erroneous to focus on foreign threats when many attacks are 
from homegrown terrorism, in A. Reed, J. Pohl and M. Jegerings, “The Four Dimen-
sions of the Foreign Fighter Threat: Making Sense of an Evolving Phenomenon”, Inter-
national Centre for Counter-Terrorism, June 2017, p. 7, <www.icct.nl/publication/the 
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The UN Security Council has famously (and controversially)25 referred to 
the phenomenon as ‘one of the most serious threats to international peace and 
security’. Back in 2014, it is noteworthy though that the risk it originally identi-
fied related to the impact in the conflict zones themselves (contributing to “the 
intensity, duration and intractability of conflicts”) not solely, or principally, 
upon return.26 Consistent with this, legal and policy responses directed at 
 alleviating risk in states of origin should be mindful of the potential to contrib-
ute to other risks for example in conflict zones or through the longer term im-
pact of the situation in the Syrian or Iraqi camps. Short and longer term threat 
assessment should include a broader risk analysis which takes into account the 
shifting and multi-dimensional nature of threats.27 This includes threats aris-
ing from responses to ftf and CT.
2.1.2 Understanding ftf ‘push and pull’ Factors, and ‘conditions 
conducive’ to the Problem
Understanding who is going, who is coming back, who is not – and, in all cases, 
why – are key questions upon which targeted and effective measures of pre-
vention and response depend.28 What emerges clearly from research to date is 
a complex multi-faceted environment, within which there is no single ftf 
 profile.29 A greater range of possible “push and pull” factors emerge than 
-four-dimensions-of-the-foreign-fighter-threat-making-sense-of-an-evolving-phenome-
non>.
25 M. Scheinin, Back to post 9/11 Panic; SC resolution 2178, Just Security (2014): https://www 
.justsecurity.org/15407/post-911-panic-security-council-resolution-foreign-terrorist-fight 
ers-scheinin/.
26 unsc Resolution 2178 (2014), refers to a “serious threat to their States of origin, the States 
they transit and the States to which they travel, as well as States neighbouring zones of 
armed conflict in which foreign terrorist fighters are active and that are affected by seri-
ous security burdens.”
27 For one assessment of the “shifting threats” see: A. Reed, J. Pohl and M. Jegerings, “The 
Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter Threat” – four main threats related to travel, re-
turn to their countries of residence, the threat posed by lone actors and sympathisers, and 
finally, the increasing polarization of society.
28 unsg Plan of Action on pve, and UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, op. cit., note.
29 Reports by civil society, academic and inter-state institutions, including the UN Office of 
Counter-Terrorism (unoct), contribute to our understanding of ftf motivations and 
contributing factors, including by giving voice to disengaged ftfs. See eg “Enhancing the 
Understanding of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Phenomenon in Syria”, unoct, July 2017, 
p. 52 (hereafter, unoct Report July 2017), <www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/assets/img/
Report_Final_20170727.pdf>. also J.M. Berger “Making cve Work: A Focused Approach 
Based on Process Disruption”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (hereafter, J.M. 
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were apparent when the issue first gained international attention,30 varying 
dramatically between individuals and contexts.31 Although samples analysed 
in  research and literature remain limited and we should be cautious to avoid 
simplistic conclusions, certain personal and ideological factors and motiva-
tions have arisen recurrently.
These include the contribution to the decision to travel of socio-economic 
realities, including high unemployment, lack of opportunities, “isolation from 
mainstream social, economic and political activity,” as well as dysfunctional 
personal and family circumstances.32 Religion is part of this landscape, though 
given how central it is often assumed to be, it is noteworthy that the role of so-
called religious “fundamentalism” as the key driving factor has been disputed. 
For example, a 2016 study by a group of mostly United States military research-
ers at West Point found that religion was “not the strongest driving force”, 
 emphasizing instead “cultural and political identities” and “a narrative that is fo-
cused on the ongoing deprivation of Muslims, both in specific Western polities, 
as well as in the international arena.”.33 Similar findings percolate out of reports 
by the UN Special Rapporteur on terrorism and human rights and the unoct; 
the latter distinguishes religion as such from a “sense of identity with – and 
Berger “Making cve Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption”), May 2016, 
which notes “push and pull factors intertwine in different ways according to the individ-
ual and the internal and external environment each one faces,” and concludes: “There are 
obvious risks in arguing for single-issue causation in settings where multiple variables are 
at play.”
30 R. Frenett and T. Silverman, “Foreign Fighters: Motivations for Travel to Foreign Conflicts”, 
in ffilb, pp. 63–76; Phil Gurski, Western Foreign Fighters: The Threat to Homeland and 
International Security (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), p. 70. Note that many analy-
ses focus on “foreign fighters” not “ftfs”.
31 unoct Report July 2017, p. 5.
32 See J.M. Berger, Ibid, “Making cve Work:”, p. 5; unoct Report July 2017, p. 5.
33 “From Cradle to Grave: The Lifecycle of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria”, Combating Ter-
rorism Center at West Point, November 2016, <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/11/
Cradle-to-Grave2.pdf>; see also: “Tariq Ramadan: As Muslims Condemn Spain Attack, 
Americans Must Denounce U.S. Killings in Syria, Iraq”, Democracy Now, 24 August 2017, 
<www.democracynow.org/2017/8/24/tariq_ramadan_as_muslims_condemn_spain>. See 
UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, Report to the UN Human Rights Council, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/31/65, 22 February 2016, para. 15: “Commentators have noted that there can 
be too much focus on religious ideology as the driver of terrorism and extremism, while 
factors related to identity, or misguided altruism, are overlooked”.
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a desire to help – co-religionists who are perceived as victimized and mistreat-
ed by other groups.”34
Profiles of those returning from conflict zones and their experiences abroad 
points to similar diversity, precluding generalized assumptions as to experi-
ence abroad or motivation for return.35 Among the many factors noted in re-
search are: disillusionment, particularly for those driven by “idealism”, the 
draw of family, dangers and conditions of life abroad. For this reason it has 
been suggested that: “[i]n dealing with returnees, it may be important to dif-
ferentiate between them based on what they actually did in Syria, their initial 
intention before going and their reasons for return.”36 Gender assumptions re-
garding experience abroad and motivation – including that women and girls 
were necessarily victims not agents – have unsurprisingly also proved errone-
ous and dangerous.37
The need for greater research and engagement to understand and address 
the myriad conditions conducive and contributing to unlawful violence is 
clear. As is the fact that simplistic attempts at classifying the problem, or iden-
tifying solutions, are bound for failure. This underlines the need for crafting 
and channeling policies of prevention and response that reflect a realistic 
and  holistic assessment of threats, and are targeted to particular cases and 
contexts.
2.2 Understanding and Addressing the Human Rights Implications of 
ftf Responses
A human rights approach plainly requires us to understand and assess the full 
array of human rights – and vast range of human beings – affected by ftf 
34 unoct Report July 2017, p. 3, noting empathy with the Sunni communities believed to be 
under attack as one of the most common reasons for travelling to Syria. Empathy for Mus-
lim victims of violence and the perceived complicity of “Western” powers are cited as 
driving factors for women who choose to join isil in Van Leuven, Mazurana and Gordon, 
“Analysing the Recruitment and Use of Foreign Men and Women in isil through a Gen-
der Perspective” in ffilb, pp. 97–121.
35 The unoct Report July 2017, p. 5, notes that “not all ftfs go to Syria with the objective of 
becoming fighters there, even less of committing atrocities.” It notes that “few of those 
who go to Syria do so with the intention of training to become a domestic terrorist upon 
their return.”
36 See unoct Report July 2017.
37 See Gender, below. In early practice in the Netherlands and Belgium, very few females 
were prosecuted, but since 2016 “no distinction” has been made. The distinction has re-
portedly narrowed in Germany. See, eg. T. Renard and R. Coolsaet (eds), “Returnees: who 
are they, why are they (not) coming back and how should we deal with them?”, Egmont 
Institute.
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 legislation, policy and practice. Understanding the impact on human rights, 
democracy and rule of law is an important aspect of the threats landscape that 
needs to be assessed.
The rights affected are not limited to the freedom of movement, liberty or 
fair trial rights most obviously implicated,38 but include the much fuller spec-
trum of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Contrary to the 
impression from the “foreign terrorist fighter” title, even those targeted by 
broadly or ill-defined laws include people far removed in conduct or intent 
from acts of violence of any type. Those affected extends much further still. 
A human rights perspective requires consideration of more than the direct and 
immediate impact on the particular rights of targeted individuals to the broad-
er impact on the rights of others, from family members, to social, political or 
religious associates and groups, and in some cases on the population at large. 
It requires longer term consideration of the implications for the erosion of le-
gal standards of the indeterminacy of the law, enhanced powers or reduced 
oversight. Given the growing and deeply troubling trend towards targeting of 
human rights defenders (hrds), humanitarian workers and opposition groups, 
it requires careful attention to the insidious impact of counter-terrorism and 
ftf laws on the ability to defend human rights and provide humanitarian as-
sistance and on the quality of democracy.
In this context, measures permitting states to restrict movement for exam-
ple may have much further reaching consequences. At first glance they most 
obviously impact on freedom of movement and the right to return to one’s 
own country of the targeted individual, which may be restricted in certain cir-
cumstances. They may however also have implications for economic and so-
cial rights, such as right to work or education of targeted individuals or their 
family members. If excluded, this can and has given rise to non-refoulement 
concerns, exposure to real risks of torture and other ill-treatment, or other seri-
ous violations, of targeted persons, families and children trapped in atrocious 
and violent circumstances overseas.39 Despite the profound impact of exclu-
sion, it is often effectively impossible to challenge, raising a fair trial or due 
38 The EU counter-terrorism directive of 15 March 2017 refers specifically to a range of civil 
and political rights – “Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Deci-
sion 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA”, European Union, 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32017L0541>.
39 As regards economic and social rights, for example, freezing of assets and suspension of 
social allowances may have a direct impact, while other measures that limit movement 
and impose residency and reporting obligations may in effect interfere with work or 
education.
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process deficit.40 The decisions regarding exclusion are in turn fed by increased 
surveillance, and sharing and retention of information, affecting the right to 
privacy of many, including potentially the population as a whole so far as mass 
surveillance increases and is normalized by reference to exceptional circum-
stances.41 The banning, criminalization and prosecution of dangerous, ‘ex-
tremist’ views that may be identified through this surveillance in turn have a 
serious impact on freedom of expression, or on freedom of thought, con-
science, religion or belief, of large sways of the population. The increased shar-
ing this information between states may involve facilitating the full range of 
violations elsewhere, from torture to right to life to the right to protest or politi-
cal participation, particularly in light of concerns that information-sharing is 
being “used by states to nefariously target those who disagree with them”.42 
What begins as a debate on permissible restrictions on freedom of movement 
to prevent ‘foreign terrorist fighting’ quickly escalates into a serious and com-
plex human rights storm undermining the full range of rights of many across 
the globe.
2.3 Applying the Law: The Flexible Human Rights Framework
A primary requirement of a human rights approach is of course that ftf re-
sponses be governed by law. National law must provide in clear and specific 
terms for measures that will, in various ways, restrict rights, and that law must 
in turn accord with the flexible framework of ihrl. That framework recognis-
es, and adjusts to accommodate, effective action against security threats in 
various ways.
So far as Chapter vii resolutions oblige states to take all necessary and fea-
sible measures to prevent and respond to threats of violence, this is reflected in 
human rights law’s positive obligations to take appropriate preventive, protec-
tive, investigative and where appropriate punitive measures. Prevention and 
prosecution are therefore consistent with, and may in certain circumstances 
be required by, the human rights approach,43 but only so far as the measures 
are targeted, framed and discharged in a human rights compliant way.
40 See judicial review below; individuals may have limited rights to challenge as a matter of 
law, or in practice, especially if they are located abroad at the time.
41 Privacy concerns are heightened by unsc Resolution 2396 (2017) and the legal framework 
must be strictly applied in its implementation.
42 Resolution 2396 (2017).
43 On positive obligations to prevent acts of terrorism, see, for example, Tagayeva and Oth-
ers v. Russia, ECtHR, 13 April 2017. Media reports of recruits being treated as “slaves” and 
various forms of ill-treatment and sexual violence by the “Islamic State” points to the 
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The need to ‘balance security and human rights’ in the CT and ftf frame-
work is a common refrain. The balance is in fact built into the legal framework, 
which adjusts to security imperatives in particular contexts, for example by 
providing for derogation from certain human rights obligations in situations of 
genuine national emergency, by enshrining permissible restrictions on certain 
rights that are necessary and proportionate to national security, and by the co-
applicability of human rights standards alongside ihl in (genuine) armed 
conflicts. However, this inherent flexibility within the law should be carefully 
distinguished from an abstract ‘balancing’ exercise so often invoked to justify 
counter-terrorism and ftf measures that go beyond the limits of the law.
Measures that restrict human rights must conform with basic legal require-
ments, including the following:
– No circumstances can justify interference with absolute rights or disregard of 
fundamental rule of law safeguards such as legality and non- arbitrariness. 
The requirement that criminal offences were clearly defined in law at 
the time committed, the presumption of innocence, core aspects of the 
right to a fair trial and to liberty, the right to religion or belief, the right 
to equality and non-discrimination and the prohibition of torture and 
other ill treatment are among the core rights that must be respected at all 
times.
– ‘Emergency’ measures must be exceptional, time-limited and justified. 
States can only rely on ‘emergency’ measures to derogate from other ob-
ligations under ihrl where the stringent test laid down in ihrl – of an 
“emergency threatening the life of the nation”44 – is met. In the context 
of ftf measures, however seriously one assesses the situation at least in 
states of travel,45 it is doubtful whether this is the case. Even if it were, the 
derogation should be invoked, and the measures adopted strictly limited 
to what is necessary pursuant to the exigencies of that emergency, and 
need to prevent and counter both such “internal” abuse as well as the broader “external” 
terrorist threat those groups pose.
44 A broad range of factors are relevant to the assessment but it is clear that the threshold is 
high, affecting “organised life of the community” (Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), ECtHR, Judg-
ment of 1 July 1961) but not necessarily imperiling the existence of the institutions of 
states as such (A and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 19 February 2009 
(hereafter, A and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR)).
45 The impact on destinations states eg Syria is distinct from the impact on potential states 
of return, and would not justify derogation in the latter.
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not be discriminatory in their application.46 Moreover, while the dura-
tion of emergencies may vary, they are, by definition, temporary and ex-
ceptional, and must be subject to review. This runs counter to recent 
practice which points to emergency measures, loosely justified, gradually 
seeping into ordinary law and practice, effectively introducing perma-
nent derogations from human rights obligations.47
– Permissible restrictions: For the most part, the rights most obviously affect-
ed by ftf provisions (such the right to privacy, freedom of expression and 
association or the right to manifest one’s religion) are qualified rights sub-
ject to permissible restrictions, provided certain requirements are met. 
Limitations to such rights must be provided for in clear law, necessary and 
proportionate to a legitimate aim such as national security, and minimized 
wherever possible. The requirement of necessity and proportionality of 
the particular measure requires a specific risk assessment of the individual 
case and context, and procedural safeguards including appropriate judi-
cial review.
46 UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, Report to the UN Human Rights Council (Re-
port on the human rights challenge of states of emergency in the context of countering 
terrorism), UN Doc. A/HRC/37/52, 27 February 2018 (hereafter ‘Special Rapporteur’s Re-
port on Emergencies’ (2018)). Emergency powers and derogations by the United Kingdom 
post 9/11 and in France, for example, have been criticized for their allegedly discrimina-
tory and therefore unlawful impact: eg. Concluding observations: United Kingdom, UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (cerd), UN Doc. CERD/C/GBR/
CO/21-23, 3 October 2016, paras. 15, 18–19; A and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR; 
Concluding observations: France, ccpr, UN Doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/5, 17 August 2015, pa-
ras. 9–10; C. Paulussen, “Repressing the Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Terrorism in 
Western Europe: Towards an Effective Response Based on Human Rights”, International 
Centre for Counter Terrorism, November 2016, <icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
ICCT-Paulussen-Rule-of-Law-Nov2016-1.pdf>, on discrimination in relation to the French 
emergency regime.
47 See also: ‘Special Rapporteur’s Report on Emergencies’ (2018); and the UN special proce-
dures statement on the state of emergency in Turkey: “UN human rights experts urge 
Turkey not to extend state of emergency”, 17 January 2018, <www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEv 
ents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22592&LangID=E>.
General Comment No. 29 (Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency), ccpr, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001, para. 2. September 2017 statement 
of the Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism notes, expressing concern at develop-
ments in France: “The duration of the state of emergency must be time-bound, revised 
regularly, and meet the criteria of necessity and proportionality”, <www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID=57759#.Wc66brpuKUk>.
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– Targeted case-by-case approach: A human rights law approach is a tar-
geted one, which rejects “one size fits all” solutions. Blanket application 
of laws and policies may not only be less effective, it may fall short of re-
quirements of individualized risk assessment implicit in the analysis of 
the necessity and proportionality of the particular measure in question.
– Remedies and accountability: Finally, a core requirement of the legal 
framework, and of non-arbitrariness, is the right of victims of violations 
to a remedy, and where appropriate accountability of those responsible. 
Legal remedies and full and effective reparation for those whose rights 
have been violated, make an essential contribution to learning from mis-
takes and shaping lawful responses for the future.
3 The Underlying Legality Challenge: Indeterminacy and Scope
3.1 “Foreign”, “Terrorist”, “Fighter”?
Multiple human rights issues arose from the use of the term “foreign terrorist 
fighters” by the UN Security Council in 2014, which has become common par-
lance since then. Key concerns include the fundamental principle of legality 
and certainty in the law which is put under severe strain by terms that are 
vague and uncertain in scope.48 Particularly stringent requirements arise in 
relation to nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) but, as noted above, 
all restrictions on rights must be provided for in clear, accessible law. By con-
trast, each element of the ftf term is vague, controversial and problematic.
– The scope of the term “terrorism” in domestic laws, linked to internation-
ally agreed definition of the term, is an old problem, but one that never 
ceases to wreak havoc.49 The wording of unsc Resolution 2178, and inter-
pretations of it, have resulted in laws of amorphous scope and reach.50 At-
tempts to limit definitions by national authorities to conduct that, in the 
words of a former UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, are of a 
“genuinely terrorist nature,” have not prevailed.51 Even the unsc’s own 
48 Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr); Article 7 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (echr).
49 For examples see H. Duffy, War on Terror and framework of international law, second edi-
tion 2015, Chapter 7B.
50 See criticism by M. Scheinin, “Back to post-9/11”.
51 UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, Report to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/98, 28 December 2005, para. 42.
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 Resolution 1566, adopted back in 2004 to provide parameters to guide states 
in elaborating clear definitions in national laws and regulations, has not 
been referred to by the Council in this context.52 Broad and ambiguous defi-
nitions of terrorism, long criticised, have been compounded by the spread 
of the ill-defined (or undefined) concepts of ‘extremism,’ and in turn in the 
ftf context, by an accumulation of additional ambiguous-related concepts 
as noted below.
– Many ftf-related provisions address travel to support “terrorist organiza-
tions” and entities, but do not make clear how such organisations will be 
identified. These entities are not limited e.g. to groups specifically designated 
or listed as “terrorist”’ by the UN or regional groupings. The problem of politi-
cization, selectivity and lack of transparency around the process of “terrorist” 
designation on the international – and particularly national –  levels are no-
torious and longstanding.53 The vast number and range of prohibited “terror-
ist” organizations and entities, unilaterally so declared by states around the 
world, means the scope and impact of ftf measures increases exponentially. 
The designation of individuals as ftfs should be based on what individuals 
have done and intended to do, not on the deemed nature, or designation, of 
a group or a cause which they are deemed to support.
– unsc Resolution 2178 (2014) associates the term “foreigner” with individu-
als who “travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality”. 
However, the term still leaves significant margin of ambiguity. In line with 
basic principles of international law, dual nationals or persons with impor-
tant personal, social, cultural and family links to states, beyond formal resi-
dence or nationality, should not be considered “foreigners” for this purpose 
when they travel to the state with which they have the relevant links.54
– Finally, although ftf-related provisions refer to “fighters”, the scope 
of  those  covered by the provisions goes far beyond those engaging in 
52 unsc Resolution 1566 para. 3.
53 One Canadian judge described the terrorist listing regime as Kafaesque; Duffy 2015 Ch. 7B. 
For concerns about listing see: e.g., the following cases considered by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the UN Human Rights Committee (ccpr): Nada v. Switzer-
land, ECtHR Judgment of 12 September 2012; Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. 
Switzerland, ECtHR, Judgment of 21 June 2016; and Sayadi & Vinck v. Belgium, ccpr, Views 
adopted on 22 October 2008, UN Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006. On national lists and pro-
cesses see uncted 2016, Implementation of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), para. 
158(b).
54 unsc Resolution 2178 (2014) para. 6 ; see S. Krähenmann, ‘The Obligations under Interna-
tional Law of the Foreign Fighter’s State of Nationality or Habitual Residence, State of 
Transit and State of Destination’ in ffilb (2016), p. 235.
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 combat.55 It reaches travelers with diverse roles abroad, in relation to quite 
different types of groups, as well as a much broader web of individuals 
deemed to be supporting, facilitating, financing, servicing or encouraging 
such travel. The fact that the various forms of facilitation, support or ser-
vices are themselves undefined contributes further indeterminacy. In light 
of available facts, which indicate that very many of those covered by ftf 
laws and policies were in fact not engaged in fighting in any way, the use of 
the label is certainly misleading.
3.2 Implications for International Humanitarian Law
The ftf description also raises concerns that are not new to counter- terrorism, 
but are particularly pronounced in the ftf context, regarding the conflation 
and confusion of “terrorism” and armed conflict.
In accordance with the introductory paragraphs of unsc Resolution 2178 
(2014) and most other unsc resolutions in the field in recent years, states 
should interpret their ftf obligations consistently with international humani-
tarian law (ihl). They must not therefore undermine its operation or effective-
ness. However, the failure to distinguish travel to “terrorism” and to engage-
ment in an “armed conflict” in the Resolutions risks doing just that.
Unlawful acts of terrorism must be distinguished from participation in a 
conflict by persons abiding by the terms of ihl. The International Committee 
of the Red Cross (icrc) and others have underscored the importance of clari-
fying this distinction to preserve the proper functioning of ihl. While partici-
pation in a non-international armed conflict may, in practice, lead to prosecu-
tion under some (but not all) domestic laws,56 ihl encourages amnesty at the 
end of the conflict for participation in conflict (as opposed to war crimes 
which are excluded). This is important to incentivize compliance with ihl, but 
also to facilitate the termination of conflict.57 A great deal is at stake then in 
55 See: UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights 
and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination (hereafter, UN 
Working Group on mercenaries), Report to the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/70/330, 19 
August 2015.
56 S. Krähenmann, “The Obligations under International Law of the Foreign Fighter’s State 
of Nationality or Habitual Residence, State of Transit and State of Destination” in ffilb, 
pp. 229–258.
57 Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume i: Rules, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press & icrc, 2009), <www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary- 
international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf>. See: Rule 159: “At the end of hostilities, 
the authorities in power must endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to per-
sons who have participated in a non-international armed conflict, or those deprived of 
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ensuring that the obligation to prosecute ‘ftfs’ is read consistently with these 
principles. If an individual is designated a “foreign terrorist fighter” in the con-
text of a conflict, this should be based on engagement in acts of terrorism so 
defined by ihl, which may constitute war crimes.58
Difficult policy and legal questions flow from this uncertainty as to the 
scope of the ftf term and its relationship with participation in armed conflict. 
Despite perceptions to the contrary, ftf-related laws and policies are not lim-
ited to the groups referred to in unsc resolutions (so-called “Islamic State”, the 
Al Nusrah Front and groups associated with Al-Qaida),59 around whom much 
of the debate revolves, or even, as noted above, to other designated terrorist 
groups. They may include much broader-reaching travel to or support for 
causes perceived to have ‘terrorist’ anti-state goals, as defined or indicated by 
affected states. They may also embrace travel to support armed groups that 
resist or fight against terrorist groups, while respecting ihl. Questions have 
arisen in several European states regarding the legitimacy and appropriateness 
of prosecutions of individuals who support organizations fighting against the 
so-called “Islamic State”. Other questions were evident before Belgian courts, 
where judges found individuals could not be prosecuted for “terrorism” in re-
spect of acts that involved engagement in a “conflict.” The result is on-going 
controversy and policy debate concerning the public interest and the interests 
of justice in pursuing such prosecutions, as well as the need to locate terrorism 
within the relevant international legal framework.60
their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, with the exception of persons sus-
pected of, accused of or sentenced for war crimes.”
58 Both Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions prohibit e.g. “[a]cts or threats of 
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population”. 
See Article 51 (2), “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol i)”, 8 June 
1977; and Article 13 (2), “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
ii)”, 8 June 1977.
59 For example, unsc Resolution 2249 (2015).
60 Questions have arisen regarding the legitimacy and appropriateness of prosecutions in 
various contexts, including in Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark of returnees who 
had fought against isil. In 2017, Belgian courts ruled that individuals could not be pros-
ecuted for “terrorism” in respect of acts that involved engagement in a “conflict”, though a 
higher court has paved the way for some prosecutions to proceed. For other cases see: 
L. Whyte, “Danish woman who fought against Isis faces jail sentence”, the Guardian, 19 
December 2016, <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/19/danish-woman-who-fought-
against-isis-faces-jail-sentence>; “Netherlands drops case against man suspected of kill-
ing Isis fighters”, the Guardian, 21 June 2016, <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/ 
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The ftf label may also give the impression that it intends to embrace par-
ticipation in armed conflict, yet its scope goes far beyond those who engage in 
“direct participation in hostilities” under humanitarian law, to include civilians 
who would enjoy the general protection of that body of law.61
One element of a rule of law approach would therefore be for states to dis-
tinguish, as recommended by the un Working Group on mercenaries, between 
participation in armed conflict, in accordance with ihl, and terrorist fight-
ing.62 One way to do so, as reflected in the practice of some States, would be to 
enshrine in law and reflect in practice, exceptions for conduct permissible un-
der ihl.63
3.3 Jeopardising Legitimate Activity: Ensuring Humanitarian/Human 
Rights Exceptions
Parallel questions arise regarding the need to exclude humanitarian workers 
and the legitimate activities of human rights defenders (hrds) from the scope 
of ‘ftf’ provisions. The provision of forms of humanitarian assistance such as 
medical aid is an activity that has long been protected under ihl.64 The posi-
tive obligations of states to create an ‘enabling environment’ for hrds is 
 reflected across ihrl.65
netherlands-drops-case-against-man-suspected-of-killing-isis-fighters>; L. Dearden, 
“Danish woman faces jail after violating travel ban for fighting against Isis with Kurdish 
groups in Syria and Iraq”, the Independent, 13 December 2016, <www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/joanna-palani-danish-kurdish-woman-ypg-peshmerga-iraq-syria-
fighting-isis-faces-jail-passport-police-a7471266.html>.
61 For further information on what constitutes “direct participation in hostilities” see e.g., 
Nils Melzer, “Interpretative guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
under international humanitarian law”, International Committee of the Red Cross (icrc), 
<www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf>.
62 UN Working Group on mercenaries, UN Doc. A/70/330.
63 E.g. section  83.01(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code defines “terrorist activity” as “not 
includ[ing] an act or omission that is committed during an armed conflict [and which is] 
in accordance with…international law applicable to the conflict”. Article 260(4) of the 
Swiss Criminal Code provides that financing terrorism does not apply if “it is intended to 
support acts that do not violate the rules of international law on the conduct of armed 
conflicts”.
64 S. Ojeda, “Out of balance: Global counter-terrorism & the laws of war”, Humanitarian 
Law & Policy blog, 15 September 2017, <blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/09/15/out-of-
balance-global-counter-terrorism-the-laws-of-war/> describing it as“a cornerstone of ihl 
since […] its codification over 150 years ago”.
65 Eg. UN Declaration on hrds; osce, Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights 
 Defenders, 2014.
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However, it follows from the breadth and scope of what has been described 
as the “ftf phenomenon” that far-reaching responses to it have thwarted and/
or punished both groups of actors. This forms part of a broader problem with 
the widespread use of counter-terrorism laws on, for example, financing, “ma-
terial support”66 or “indirect incitement” of terrorism,67 being used against 
hrds and humanitarian organizations in recent years. The expanded prohibi-
tions, crimes and restrictions and increased legal and regulatory scrutiny sur-
rounding ftfs exacerbate the problem significantly.68
The implications for human rights and humanitarian protection are pro-
found and wide-reaching. ftf provisions jeopardise the ability of medical per-
sonnel to treat “fighters” wounded on the battlefield, of humanitarian workers 
and hrds’ to engage with groups perceived as “terrorist” for example to gain 
access and provide relief to civilian populations, and the willingness of donors 
and financial institutions to provide essential funds and services, particularly 
in situations of armed conflict where they may be most needed.69 Real con-
cerns have emerged that responses apparently directed to ftfs, under cover of 
Security Council resolutions, may render essential humanitarian work practi-
cally impossible and undermine human rights defence, by stigmatizing per-
sons or causes disfavoured by the state.
States should therefore ensure that careful, narrowly constructed but effec-
tive exceptions are carved out to ensure that those engaged in genuine human 
rights and humanitarian work are not unduly restricted in that work, but are 
protected in accordance with the obligations of states under international 
66 J.A. Fraterman, “Criminalising Humanitarian Relief: Are U.S. Material Support for Terror-
ism Laws Compatible with International Humanitarian Law?”, International Law and Poli-
tics, 2014, pp. 401–402; K. Mackintosh and P. Duplat, “Study of the Impact of Donor 
 Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action”, UN Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs (ocha) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (nrc), July 
2013, pp. 20, 39–44.
67 For more detailed discussion and examples of issues arising from crimes of expression: 
H. Duffy and K. Pitcher, “Inciting Terrorism? Crimes of Expression and the Limits of the 
Law”, Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University, 4 April 2018, 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3156210> (hereafter, H. Duffy and K. Pitcher, “Inciting Terror-
ism? Crimes of Expression and the Limits of the Law”).
68 J. Burniske, D.A. Lewis, and N.K. Modirzadeh, “Suppressing Foreign Terrorist Fighters and 
Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action: A Provisional Framework for Analyzing State 
Practice”, October 2015, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2673502>.
69 “Tightening the Purse Strings: What Countering Terrorism Financing Costs Gender Equal-
ity and Security”, Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic and Women Peacemakers 
Program, March 2017, <law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/humanrights/tighteningpurse-
strings.pdf> Ibid.
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 human rights and humanitarian law. A limited number of states have sought to 
carve out exceptions for humanitarian operations and it is to be hoped that 
more follow suit.70
4 Criminal Law Responses: Principles, Procedures and Penalties
In principle, so far as ftfs have committed or contributed to serious crimes 
abroad, criminal law has an important role to play. It can secure accountability, 
while providing robust guarantees of fairness including ensuring that suspects 
know and can respond to allegations against them. As such, a criminal law ap-
proach may fare favourably when compared to the application of administra-
tive or executive measures, that can have just as serious rights consequences 
and punitive effects, absent the safeguards. But the fairness, legitimacy and 
effectiveness of criminal law responses depends on consistency with funda-
mental principles of criminal law and ihrl, which are often compromised in 
this context.
In their counter-terrorism efforts, states have increasingly sought to use 
criminal law preventively – by criminalizing conduct arising before a terrorist 
crime is committed (i.e., preparatory acts, and acts deemed to support or con-
tribute to terrorism, such as financing, providing material support or inciting 
terrorism directly or indirectly). The development of specific legislation on 
ftfs, and prosecutions in practice, take this trend a step further. Much legisla-
tion now criminalizes travelling or the attempt to travel as preparatory 
acts, as well as conduct deemed to facilitate or support the travel of another 
individual.
The preventive role of criminal law is not inherently problematic, but it has 
significant limits.71 The expansion of criminal law in this context raises ques-
tions regarding consistency with basic principles of criminal and human rights 
70 Eg. See: Australian Criminal Code, division 102.8(4)(c); and New Zealand Terrorism Sup-
pression Act 2002, sections 9(1) and (2). Although the United States material support stat-
ute once also contained a “humanitarian assistance” exception, this has been abolished 
and US courts have found any form of material assistance to terrorist organizations, even 
provision of training to promote respect for ihl that plainly serves ends of counter- 
terrorism, to constitute “material support”. See: Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
(2010), United States Supreme Court, 561 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct. 2705, (hereafter, Holder v. Humani-
tarian Law Project).
71 Eg inchoate acts such as attempts, direct and public incitement, some preparatory acts, or 
conspiracy may justify the early intervention of criminal law before any terrorist act has 
taken place.
Downloaded from Brill.com03/20/2020 02:07:15PM
via free access
 141foreign Terrorist Fighters
security and human rights 29 (2018) 120-172
<UN>
law, with broader implications for the effectiveness of criminal law and terror-
ism prevention.
4.1 The Principle of Legality: Clear and Precise Definitions of Offences
The non-derogable principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege) reflected in, 
for example, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (iccpr)72 requires that the scope of crimes must be clearly defined in 
law at the time of the alleged offence. The principle of lex certa requires that 
criminal law must be sufficiently clear, precise and foreseeable to allow those 
within a state’s jurisdiction to understand the law’s limits and modify their be-
haviour.73 Crimes, inchoate offences and modes of liability that criminalise 
 ill-defined support for ill-defined ‘terrorist fighting’, “justifying”, “provoking” 
or “apology” for terrorism, or “disseminating messages” in relation to ftf ac-
tivities, are extremely expansive in their potential scope and ridden with 
ambiguity.
The obligations on states in unsc Resolution 2178 (2014) to establish crimi-
nal offences for a broad range of conduct, without defining the terms or iden-
tifying the basic mental and material elements (or the criminal intent and con-
duct), has been much criticized.74 However, it falls to states to give the 
framework of obligations effect in a manner that respects the principle of le-
gality, clarifies the scope of criminality and specifically defines the material 
and mental elements of ftf-related crimes.
Furthermore, the law must be interpreted “in such a way as to provide effec-
tive safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment.”75 
As an offshoot of this principle, criminal law should be strictly applied and 
 restrictively interpreted; it should not be interpreted by analogy, and any 
72 Article 15(1) iccpr, Article 11(2) udhr; Article 7(1) echr; Article 9 of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights (achr); see also Articles 22 (Nullum crimen sine lege) and 23 
(Nulla poena sine lege) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (icc).
73 A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
pp. 113–114, (hereafter, A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice).
74 M. Scheinin, “Back to post-9/11” op. cit.
75 See: S.W. v. United Kingdom and C.R. v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgments of 22 Novem-
ber 1995, cited in Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Judgment of 22 March 2001, para. 
50. The passage continues: “It should be construed and applied, as follows from its object 
and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary prosecu-
tion, conviction and punishment.”
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 ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the accused.76 National laws and 
some prosecutorial practice may, however, suggest the contrary.77
4.2 Criminal Responsibility and Individual Culpability
The most basic principle of criminal law is that individuals are held responsi-
ble for their own conduct and any associated intent.78 Responsibility must be 
individual, not collective.79 It cannot be based solely on association with oth-
ers, or expression of opinions about their activities, absent an intentional con-
tribution to criminal acts. Conduct with intent – actus reus and mens rea, or 
the material and mental elements – provide the objective and subjective con-
ditions for punishability and form the essential nexus between the individual 
and the criminal wrong.80
The intervention of criminal law is generally justified where an individual 
has caused or contributed to harm to a protected value (the “harm principle”).81 
As an exception, criminal law also penalizes inchoate crimes, before the harm 
has arisen, where conduct committed with criminal intent poses a significant 
danger of serious harm.82 Criminal law cannot, however, proscribe abstract 
danger. It cannot prosecute what one might do, but what one has done and in-
tended to do. It cannot punish thoughts, however dangerous society  perceives 
76 See e.g., “European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 on an EU approach to criminal 
law (2010/2310(ini))”, European Parliament, P7_TA(2012)0208, <https://eur-lex.europa 
.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52012IP0208> (hereafter, European Parliament, EU 
Approach to Criminal Law).
77 Examples appear below, or in the osce report, and in Duffy and Pitcher, Crimes of 
Expression.
78 See e.g., European Parliament, EU Approach to Criminal Law.
79 icty, Prosecutor v. Tadic, (Case No. IT-94-1-A), Judgment (Appeals Chamber), 15 July 1999, 
para. 186: “nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts in which he has not person-
ally engaged or in some way participated”. On the prohibition on collective punishments 
in ihl (as well as ihrl), see Article 33 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (iv) on Civilians; 
Article 75 of Additional Protocol i, Article 6(2) Additional Protocol ii.
80 A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice; and fuller discussion in H. Duffy and 
K. Pitcher, “Inciting Terrorism? Crimes of Expression and the Limits of the Law”.
81 For a discussion of the “harm principle” see: A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive 
Justice.
82 Examples would include direct and public incitement to genocide in international crimi-
nal law, where the conduct (the expression) in question creates a significant danger that 
this serious crime will be committed, and the accused intends this to happen; this can be 
punished even if the crime does not ultimately occur. Preparatory acts, which may in-
clude planning or conspiracy with a view to committing or contributing to a terrorist of-
fence, may also be prosecuted if the relevant elements are met.
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them to be, but can only intervene when they are converted into concrete 
acts.83 In some circumstances, the intervention may be before the impact of 
the action and intent is felt, or indeed the harm may ultimately be caused by 
another person; there must however be sufficient ‘normative involvement’ of 
an individual in the wrongful act, or at the very least in the deliberate creation 
of risk of such an act.84 Conversely, remoteness is a constraining principle of 
criminal law, such that individuals cannot be prosecuted absent a meaningful 
proximate link between them and the wrong towards which the coercive pow-
er of the criminal law is directed.85
By contrast, many ftf-related provisions detach criminal conduct from any 
appreciable harm or consequence in the external world. Many offences of trav-
el, support, financing or “glorification” of it, have extremely tangential links, if 
any, to future terrorist attacks, but are prosecuted on the basis that they may 
create a risk of such eventual attacks.86 There need be no contribution towards 
any act of terrorism, nor any intent to make such a contribution,87 as intent to 
83 In accordance with the Roman law principle cogitationis poenam nemo patitur (“no-
body endures punishment for thought.”, Justinian’s Digest (48.19.18)); A. Ashworth and 
L. Zedner, Preventive Justice, op. cit., p. 110. A provision in French counter-terrorism legisla-
tion, which was declared unconstitutional by the French Constitutional Council in 2017, 
sought to criminalize consultation of terrorist websites, without requiring terrorist intent; 
see B. Boutin, “Excesses of Counter-Terrorism and Constitutional Review in France: The 
Example of the Criminalisation of the Consultation of Websites”, Verfassungsblog, 10 May 
2018, <https://verfassungsblog.de/where-visiting-a-website-is-now-a-crime-excesses-of-
counter-terrorism-and-constitutional-review-in-france/>.
84 For crimes, such as terrorist attacks, to be imputed to another who, for example, possesses 
material or makes statements that may be deemed by some to “glorify” such acts, the 
original actor must have had “some form of normative involvement [in the other per-
son’s] subsequent choice” to commit a crime and “the intent to cause the final crime it-
self”. See: A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice, op. cit., p. 112.
85 A. Ashworth and L. Zedner, Preventive Justice, p. 109.
86 Eg. in the United Kingdom crimes of “encouragement to terrorism” explicitly note that 
impact is irrelevant. Convictions include the cases against Tareena Shakil who tweeted 
support for isil and posted isil iconography; and Mohammed Moshin Ameen in which 
the accused was described by the court as risking “the emulation of terrorist actions” 
through opinions which inter alia “establish[ed] religious and social grounds for terrorist 
action”. A borther sending money to his sister to return home, which could have been for 
terrorist purposes, though that was indisputably not his intention. In some cases, judges 
have insisted on some direct connection to an act of terrorism. See eg H. Duffy and 
K. Pitcher, “Inciting Terrorism? Crimes of Expression and the Limits of the Law”.
87 The risk of prosecution on charges of “material support” for providing training to promote 
respect for ihl or prosecution of individuals sending money abroad to their children 
for basic needs illustrates the decreasing regard for terrorist intent in the application of 
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travel to a conflict zone, to facilitate such travel, or to provide funding in the 
knowledge that it could be used for terrorist ends may suffice.88 Arguably the 
link between the individual and the crime becomes extremely strained and 
unduly remote.89 While an expansive approach to criminal law may reflect an 
understandable desire to ‘defend further up the field’, intervening early to pre-
vent terrorism, in doing so it risks upending the principles on which the legiti-
macy of criminal law depends.90
4.3 The Principle of Restraint in Criminal law
Concern surrounding individual culpability are linked to the principle that 
criminal law is an exceptional framework, a last resort or ultima ratio. This is 
linked to a general “culture of executive restraint”91 in resort to criminal law. 
The ‘EU approach to Criminal Law’ by the European Parliament explains the 
principle of restraint in these terms:
… in view of its being able by its very nature to restrict certain human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of suspected, accused or convicted per-
sons, in addition to the possible stigmatising effect of criminal investiga-
tions, and taking into account that excessive use of criminal legislation 
leads to a decline in efficiency, criminal law must be applied as a measure 
of last resort (ultima ratio) addressing clearly defined and delimited con-
duct, which cannot be addressed effectively by less severe measures and 
which causes significant damage to society or individuals…92
 counter-terrorism legislation, see: Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project; and cases involv-
ing family member prosecutions for terrorism financing in: B. Boutin, “Has Countering 
the Financing of Terrorism Gone Wrong? Prosecuting the Parents of Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2 October 2017, <icct.nl/publica 
tion/countering-the-financing-of-terrorism-gone-wrong-prosecuting-the-parents-of-for 
eign-terrorist-fighters/>.
88 According to unsc Resolution 2178 (2014) acts of support, organization or facilitation 
have to be “wilful” but (unlike for individuals who travel) do not have to have the purpose 
of participation in or support for terrorism.
89 On remoteness se Duffy and Pitcher, ref.
90 D. Anderson, “Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism without Defeating the 
Law”, UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 15 June 2013, <terrorismlegisla-
tionreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/SHIELDING-THE-COM 
PASS1.pdf>, p. 6, (hereafter, D. Anderson, “Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism 
without Defeating the Law”).
91 Anderson, Ibid.
92 European Parliament, EU Approach to Criminal Law.
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Recent international practice, particularly in the areas of counter-terrorism 
raise serious doubts as to whether this principle governs in practice. Contro-
versial examples include the convictions of mothers and other family mem-
bers for sending basic funds to their children overseas under broad terrorist 
financing provisions, on the basis that they “knew the recipient was radi-
calised” so there was a risk the money could have been used for terrorist pur-
pose.93 Additional concerns arise from the fact that expansive criminalization 
has provided a legal pretext for the prosecution of journalists, ngo leaders, 
academics, lawyers and others under broadly framed counter-terrorism crimi-
nal laws, as referred to above.94 There is a need for urgent efforts to reverse the 
trend in many countries of counter-terrorism legislation being applied in an 
abusive manner.95
Prosecuting authorities also play a crucial role in exercising discretion in the 
selection of cases and strict application of the law. However, this is no alterna-
tive to clarity in the law itself. As British judge Lord Bingham has noted, “the 
rule of law is not well served if a crime is defined in terms wide enough to cover 
conduct which is not regarded as criminal and it is then left to the prosecuting 
authorities … not to prosecute to avoid injustice”.96 The broad (and arguably 
dangerous97) terms of Resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017), make it all the 
more important that national legislatures engage in a rigorous and inclusive 
process in which they consider the “value, efficiency and rule of law compli-
ance” of criminal law measures in this field.98
93 See B. Boutin, “Has Countering the Financing of Terrorism Gone Wrong? Prosecuting the 
Parents of Foreign Terrorist Fighters”. A UK example from 2019 is reported at https://www 
.bbc.com/news/uk-england-hampshire-46874831.
94 Concerns about the unwarranted application of offences related to “terrorism” or so-
called “extremism” are well documented. See for example, “The Responsibility of States’: 
Protection of Human Rights Defenders in the osce Region (2014–2016)”, osce/odihr, 14 
September 2017, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/341366>.
95 Successive European Commissioners express such concerns in the context of Turkey 
since the 2015 coup attempt.
96 D. Anderson, “Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism without Defeating the 
Law”.
97 F. Ní Aoláin, “The UN Security Council, Global Watch Lists, Biometrics and the threat to 
the rule of law” criticized the UN Security Council for “directing criminal legislative prac-
tice in expanded ways,” with problematic effects.
98 Ibid.
Downloaded from Brill.com03/20/2020 02:07:15PM
via free access
Duffy
security and human rights 29 (2018) 120-172
<UN>
146
4.4 Process and Penalties
Concerns regarding the ever-expanding scope of criminal law are compound-
ed by procedures that undermine fair trial rights, and by the onerous penalties 
for ftf-related acts.
Resort to “special courts and administrative boards” to prosecute ftf crimes 
in a range of states around the world undermine international due-process 
standards.99 A 2018 UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (ctitf) 
guidance to states stresses that the use of military courts to try civilians will 
only be legitimate if regular civilian courts are unavailable and recourse to 
military courts is unavoidable.100 Likewise, the reality of ftf phenomenon has 
meant that trials in absentia have increased, despite having long been contro-
versial as a matter of human rights law.101 Non-disclosure of information and 
evidence is a recurrent problem, jeopardizing the right of the accused to know 
evidence against them and have a meaningful opportunity to refute it.102 In 
exceptional circumstances it may it be legitimate to withhold certain informa-
tion, for example where necessary to protect national security, the rights of 
witnesses or sources, but provided this is sufficiently counter-balanced by ad-
equate procedural guarantees to ensure an overall fair trial.103 In turn, caution 
99 The right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal is part of the non deroga-
ble core of fair trial rights. See “‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ Laws, Human Rights Rollbacks 
Under UN Security Council Resolution 2178”, Human Rights Watch, December 2016, p. 16.
100 UN ctitf Guidance 2018, p. 42. The US military commissions established to try Guantá-
namo detainees for law of war violations and for “other offenses”, including material sup-
port for terrorism, are a case in point.
101 Article 14 of the iccpr entitles anyone accused of a criminal offence to be present during 
their trial. Both the UN Human Rights Committee (ccpr) and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR) have found that trials in absentia can be permitted if individuals 
tried and convicted when they are overseas are granted the right to a retrial when they 
can be present, the accused has notice of the proceedings and is legally represented. See: 
General Comment No. 32 UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007, para. 36. In absentia 
trials of ftfs have reportedly been held in, e.g., Belgium, Denmark, France and the Neth-
erlands. See: “The return of foreign fighters to EU soil. Ex-post evaluation”, European Par-
liamentary Research Service, pp. 50 and 86–87. See also: “Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Euro-
just’s Views on the Phenomenon and the Criminal Justice Response, Fourth Eurojust 
Report”, Eurojust, November 2016, p. 15 (hereafter, Eurojust Report 2016).
102 See: Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations: A Practical Manual for Law En-
forcement Officers, (Warsaw: osce/odihr, November 2013), p. 48, <www.osce.org/odi-
hr/108930>, (hereafter, Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations, osce/odihr); 
and General Comment No. 32, ccpr, para. 33.
103 Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations, osce/odihr, p. 48; and Rowe and Da-
vis v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 16 February 2000.
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is due to ensure that the presumption of innocence is not jeopardized, for ex-
ample by criminalizing travel to certain areas unless the accused can prove a 
legitimate purpose arguably shifting the burden of proof.104
The heightened penalties attached to terror-related and ftf crimes in many 
states (including mandatory penalties in some) raise questions of proportion-
ality of punishment.105 Sentences must be commensurate with the crime, and 
with the individual’s role in that crime.106 Assumptions as to the gravity of 
ftf-related offences may not stand up in light of their expanded scope, em-
bracing minor forms of potential contribution without clear criminal intent.
Courts must be able to take into account all of the circumstances in assess-
ing appropriate and proportionate penalties.107 The diverse profiles of ftfs, 
examples of vulnerability on account of age, mental health or intellectual abil-
ity, and a sometimes complex intermingling of perpetration and victimhood, 
speak to the importance of careful consideration of whether to prosecute at 
all, and if so, how to punish. Myriad human rights issues arise in relation to 
detention practices,108 including concerns that prisons are environments in 
104 Australia’s Foreign Fighters Law of 2014 criminalized travel to a “declared area where ter-
rorist organizations engage in hostile activity”, subject to the individual proving that pres-
ence there was for “a sole legitimate purpose”; see: “‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ Laws, Hu-
man Rights Rollbacks Under UN Security Council Resolution 2178”, Human Rights Watch, 
p. 14. See also eg. Sentencing decision in R v Anjem Choudary and Mohammed Rahman, 
Central Criminal Court, Great Britain, Sentencing Remarks, 6 September 2016, Interna-
tional Crimes Database, <http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/3273>; con-
victed for signing an oath of allegiance and broadcasting lectures, sentencing remarks 
noted that the defendants did nothing to condemn “Islamic State”.
105 Some examples of penalties include 17–18 years of imprisonment for contributing to re-
cruitment (“Albania Jails Nine Jihadi Recruiters”, BalkanInsight, 4 May 2016, <www.balka-
ninsight.com/en/article/heavy-sentences-spelled-for-albania-jihadi-recruit-
ers-05-04-2016>). Laws in the UK provide for up to seven years of imprisonment for 
“encouragement to terrorism” (Terrorism Act (2006), Section 1 (7)). See also “‘Foreign Ter-
rorist Fighter’ Laws, Human Rights Rollbacks Under UN Security Council Resolution 2178”, 
(Human Rights Watch).
106 In accordance with the principle of individual guilt (nulla poena sine culpa); see: Euro-
pean Parliament, EU Approach to Criminal Law, op. cit and Article 25 of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (icc).
107 ihrl requires a balanced assessment of appropriate punishment not automatic penal-
ties. For examples of court approaches see, for example, Eurojust Report 2016, p. 13, op. cit.
108 Eg Articles 7, 10, 17 iccpr. Eg. “UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-
Custodial Measures for Women Offenders” (Bangkok Rules), GARes. 65/229 on 21 Decem-
ber 2010, UN Doc. A/RES/65/229; Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Eurojust’s Views on the Phe-
nomenon and the Criminal Justice Response, 4th report, 19 April 2017, p. 5.
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which violent extremism spreads.109 However, despite this there may still be 
insufficient attention paid to alternatives to custodial sentences, reflected in 
practice in a number of States,110 and to grappling with meaningful efforts at 
rehabilitation in the criminal context.111
5 “Administrative Measures”
The trend towards increasing use of administrative measures in countering 
terrorism is particularly visible in the ftf context. The term “administrative 
measures” is generally used to refer to restrictive measures, of a non-criminal 
nature, that are imposed by the executive in the name of terrorism preven-
tion.112 Although increasingly onerous and wide-reaching in their impact, they 
are characteristically accompanied by limited judicial review or opportunities 
to challenge113 and little or no access to information concerning the basis for 
the measures. States need to address and take seriously the concern that the 
upsurge in administrative measures in the counter-terrorism context,  including 
109 odihr and Penal Reform International (pri) guide for detention monitors on the protec-
tion of human rights in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization 
that leads to terrorism (verlt) in prison (2019).
110 Eurojust Report 2016, examples of judicial alternatives to imprisonment, including the 
attachment of “specific conditions” directed at the “rehabilitation, disengagement and/or 
de-radicalisation of ftfs”.
111 On rehabilitation more broadly, see eg. “Declaration on strengthening osce efforts to 
prevent and counter terrorism” adopted by the osce Ministerial Council in Hamburg on 
9 December 2016, MC.DOC/1/16, (hereafter, osce Declaration on strengthening osce ef-
forts to prevent and counter terrorism); and “Ministerial Declaration on preventing and 
countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism”, adopted by the 
osce Ministerial Council in Belgrade on 4 December 2015, MC.DOC/4/15 (hereafter, osce 
Ministerial Declaration on verlt). See also unoct Report July 2017, op. cit; “Rome Mem-
orandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist 
Offenders”, Global Counterterrorism Forum (gctf). See also: E. Entenmann, L. van der 
Heide, D. Weggemans, J. Dorsey, “Rehabilitation for Foreign Fighters? Relevance, Chal-
lenges and Opportunities for the Criminal Justice Sector”.
112 See, for example, B. Boutin, “Administrative Measures against Foreign Fighters: In Search 
of Limits and Safeguards”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 16 December 2016, 
<https://icct.nl/publication/administrative-measures-against-foreign-fighters-in-search-
of-limits-and-safeguards/>, (hereafter, B. Boutin, “Administrative Measures against For-
eign Fighters: In Search of Limits and Safeguards”).
113 Ibid, p. 5.
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ftf-related acts, is “a repressive tool which problematically circumvents the 
procedures and guarantees of criminal prosecution.”114
5.1 Limits on Permissible Deprivation of Nationality (and Exclusion)
Particular concerns arise in relation to the growing practice, adopted in a num-
ber of states, and proposed in others, of citizenship-stripping of individuals 
who have engaged in ftf-related acts or are considered to pose a terrorist 
threat.115 In some cases, judicial findings of violations have led to policy rever-
sal, but the trend in the adoption of such laws and policies continues.116
The right to a nationality is set out in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (udhr) and other international instruments.117 International law does 
not confer a right to any particular nationality, and it provides for discretion to 
states to grant and revoke nationality, including when individuals have con-
ducted themselves in a manner “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of 
the state”.118 However, deprivation of nationality is an extreme measure for in-
dividuals targeted and those around them, which interferes, directly and indi-
rectly, with the enjoyment of a much broader range of rights, and to a signifi-
cant extent hampers an individual’s ability to claim and secure her/his rights at 
all. It is accordingly subject to strict limits.
If stripping of citizenship is used at all, it should be the most exceptional 
circumstances. Moreover, deprivation of nationality must not result in state-
lessness, in law or in fact.119 Courts have held that it is insufficient that the 
114 B. Boutin, “Administrative Measures against Foreign Fighters: In Search of Limits and 
Safeguards”, p. 19.
115 Such laws and practice emerged, for example, in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Netherlands and France. See B. van Ginkel and E. Entenmann 
(eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union”.
116 In the UK, eg., practices have been modified following litigation, whereas in Canada in 
June 2017 the government repealed amendments to legislation that had revoked citizen-
ship for joining an armed group in a conflict abroad. The Global Database on Modes of 
Loss of Citizenship notes more than 130 countries around the world have such legislation 
on the books, including 19 EU Member States.
117 Article 15 of the udhr provides that everyone has a right to a nationality and that no one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality nor denied the right to change na-
tionality. According to Article 24 (3) of the iccpr and Article 7 (1) of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (crc), every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
118 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961, Article 8 (3). see UN 
Secretary General, Report to the Human Rights Council (“Human rights and arbitrary de-
privation of nationality”), UN Doc. A/HRC/25/28, 19 December 2013, para. 12.
119 According to Article 8 (1) of the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and 
Article 7 (3) of the European Convention on Nationality of the Council of Europe, state 
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 individual “could be eligible for another nationality”, if stripping nationality 
renders the person stateless.120 The deprivation of nationality must not be 
arbitrary,121 prescribed by law, necessary and proportionate to the intended 
aim and not discriminatory. Laws that allow for nationality to be deprived in 
cases where it is deemed “conducive to the public good”,122 set a much lower 
threshold than necessity and proportionality, as required by international hu-
man rights law.123 Where someone joining a banned or “extremist” organiza-
tion is automatically deprived of citizenship, states end up skipping the careful 
case-by-case consideration of legal tests required by human rights law. A prac-
tical and effective right to challenge deprivation of their nationality before a 
court of law is also essential; in practice, however, even where there is an ap-
peal in theory, when individuals are abroad at the relevant time they often 
have no meaningful right in practice.124 Finally, questions also arise as to 
whether deprivation of nationality is discriminatory, in law or more often in 
parties to those treaties should not deprive anyone of their nationality if that would ren-
der them stateless. Both treaties only allow for exceptions to this rule in strictly limited 
circumstances. For general recognition of the need to avoid statelessness, UN General 
Assembly Resolution 50/152, UN Doc. A/RES/50/152, 21 December 1995, para. 16; UN Sec-
retary General, Report to the Human Rights Council UN Doc. A/HRC/10/34, 26 January 
2009, para. 51.
120 UN Secretary General, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/28, para. 4see also UN Secretary General, 
 Report to the Human Rights Council (“Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of national-
ity”), UN Doc. A/HRC/13/34, 14 December 2009, para. 59.
121 This is explicit in, for example, Article 15 udhr; Article 20 achr.
122 This standard is employed eg in the UK under the Immigration Act 2014. See D. Ander-
son, “Citizenship Removal Resulting in Statelessness, first report of the independent 
reviewer on the operation of the power to remove citizenship obtained by naturalisa-
tion from persons who have no other citizenship”, UK Independent Reviewer of Terror-
ism Legislation, April 2016, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizenship 
-removal-resulting-in-statelessness>.
123 Eg,. a bill signed into law in Kazakhstan in July 2017 providing for revocation of citizenship 
of individuals convicted of terrorist crimes and other offences causing grave harm to the 
country’s vitally important interests has been criticized for its vagueness and potential 
impact; see eg. “Nations in Transit 2018, Kazakhstan, Country Profile”, Freedom House, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/kazakhstan.
124 See, for example, “Foreign Fighters under International Law”, Geneva Academy of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Academy Briefing No. 7, pp. 57–58, <www 
.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Publications/Academy%20Brief 
ings/Foreign%20Fighters_2015_WEB.pdf>.
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practice; for example, provisions that distinguish naturalized persons from 
others have been criticized for creating a group of “second-class citizens”.125
In practice, stripping of nationality often precedes or is linked to other steps 
that implicate human rights, such as denial of entry to a state, deportation or 
even in extreme cases targeted killing. In some cases, as in targeted killings, it 
has no bearing whatever on the lawfulness under ihrl of that action. It should 
be noted that it does not necessarily entitle the state to lawfully exclude an 
individual from its territory either, as the right to enter or leave one’s own 
country126 is not limited to “nationals” under human rights law, but to those 
with a relevant and substantial link to the state.127 Nor, as a matter of law, does 
deprivation of nationality affect the right not to be expelled, returned or extra-
dited to another state where there are real risks of serious human rights viola-
tions such as torture and other ill-treatment if used (as is often the case) as a 
precursor to deportation.
As ever, due consideration should also be given to the question of the effec-
tiveness of deprivation of nationality, and associated measures128 “Risk expor-
tation”, whereby measures are taken that seek to protect a particular state by 
pushing the perceived threat beyond its borders, may not contribute to sus-
tainable long-term security,129 and may even be counter-productive if the ex-
clusion forces individuals to remain in or revert to conflict zones, or in contexts 
in which terrorism and violent extremism thrive. This would appear to be 
125 The report deals also with dual nationals; see also the debate of such provisions in the 
Netherlands in B. Boutin, “Administrative Measures against Foreign Fighters: In Search of 
Limits and Safeguards”. For similar concerns relating to practices and previously contem-
plated proposals about citizenship deprivation in other countries, including Belgium, 
France and the United Kingdom, see also “Europe: Dangerously disproportionate: The 
ever-expanding national security state in Europe”, Amnesty International, 17 January 2017, 
pp. 58–63, <www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur01/5342/2017/en/>.
126 General Comment No. 27 (Article 12: Freedom of movement), ccpr, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.9, 2 November 1999, paras. 19–21.
127 Ibid., (ccpr). The International Law Commission (ilc) has noted that deprivation of citi-
zenship for the sole purpose of expulsion would be “abusive, indeed arbitrary within the 
meaning of article 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. See 
Commentary to article 8 of the Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, in Report to the 
UN General Assembly, International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/69/10, 2014, p. 32.
128 See eg M. Benton and N.Banulescu-Bogdan, Foreign Fighters: Will Revoking Citizenship 
Mitigate the Threat? Migration Policy Institute, 3 April 2019.
129 See report of the UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, D. Anderson, 
“Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism without Defeating the Law”; see also 
R. Bauböck and V. Paskalev, “Citizenship Deprivation A Normative Analysis”, March 2015, 
<www.ceps.eu/publications/citizenship-deprivation-normative-analysis>.
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 incompatible with the obligations under unsc Resolution 2178 (2014), which 
requires states to co-operate with each other to address the effectively threats 
of ftfs.130
5.2 Deprivation of Liberty and Restrictions on Freedom of Movement
Travel bans and revocation of passports are two of the prime methods of 
choice employed by states in respect to ftfs.131 International law grants every-
one the right to leave any country (eg. Article 12 of the iccpr), including their 
own, subject to permissible restrictions, and the principles of legality, necessity 
and proportionality.132 Naturally, travel can be restricted to prevent acts of ter-
rorist violence, for example, but the nature of some travel restrictions has been 
criticized for being so broad as to be arbitrary and disproportionate.133
Even greater concern attends so-called preventive or administrative deten-
tion (on security grounds without criminal charges) of persons perceived to 
constitute a threat. While this has long been held to violate the basic right to 
liberty, and potentially equality, in the ‘war on terror’ context, it has made a 
troubling reappearance in some states in the ftf context.134 Detaining an 
 individual on the basis of a perceived risk of travel and of potentially contrib-
uting in some way to ill-defined ftf threats falls foul of the requirement that 
130 See the argument developed in G. Goodwin Gil, “‘Temporary Exclusion Orders’ and their 
Implications for the United Kingdom’s International Legal Obligations, Part ii”, 9 Decem-
ber 2014, <www.ejiltalk.org/temporary-exclusion-orders-and-their-implications-for-the 
-united-kingdoms-international-legal-obligations-part-ii/>.
131 “‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ Laws, Human Rights Rollbacks Under UN Security Council 
Resolution 2178”, Human Rights Watch, cites Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Tajikistan, the United Kingdom and others as having 
 enacted travel bans.
132 For further considerations concerning freedom of movement see UN ctitf Guidance 
2018, pp. 15–20.
133 Ibid.
134 This is clear from other contexts such as security detention of non-nationals in the United 
Kingdom post 9/11, see: A and Others v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, or the French Conseil 
d’État issued an advisory opinion against preventive administrative detention on security 
grounds proposed in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, see: 
“Avis sur la constitutionnalité et la compatibilité avec les engagements internationaux de 
la France de certaines mesures de prévention du risque de terrorisme”, Conseil d’État, 
 Assemblée générale, Section de l’intérieur, 17 December 2015, <www.conseil-etat.fr/Deci 
sions-Avis-Publications/Avis/Selection-des-avis-faisant-l-objet-d-une-communication 
-particuliere/Mesures-de-prevention-du-risque-de-terrorisme>.
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deprivation of liberty must have a lawful basis and cannot be “arbitrary”.135 
Procedural safeguards, including a meaningful and effective opportunity to 
challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention promptly before a judge, have also 
been compromised.136
Certain practices that have emerged in some states, such as short-term de-
tention for questioning or to prevent imminent travel, house arrest or assigned 
residence, control orders or limitations on movement to and within certain 
areas, may not be presented as deprivation of liberty, but this is a question of 
fact;137 they must be carefully assessed to determine whether the degree of 
control is such that they amount to deprivation of liberty. They must also be 
subject to all legal safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of liberty required 
under ihrl.
5.3 Inter-state Cooperation: Gathering and Sharing Information and 
Evidence
It follows from the foregoing that the focus of ftf measures should, so far as 
possible, be on the conduct of individuals. In particular, where established 
crimes, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity were committed, states 
should cooperate to ensure accountability. This involves cooperating to over-
come the many practical, evidentiary and jurisdictional challenges to investi-
gation and prosecution that arise for an array of reasons, including the location 
of suspects, witnesses and other evidence, restrictions on evidence from for-
eign partners and others. Serious attention is due to considering and sharing 
135 While the Article 9 iccpr prohibits arbitrary detention, Article 5 echr (Article 5) pro-
vides an exhaustive list of grounds of detention (e.g., pursuant to criminal charge or 
pending deportation) which do not include security detention., The UN Human Rights 
Committee makes clear that such detention will be arbitrary save in the most exceptional 
circumstances – General Comment No. 35 (Article 9: Liberty and security of person), ccpr, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 December 2014, para. 15 (hereafter General Comment No. 35, 
ccpr).
136 Eg “UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment”, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 43/173, 9 December 1988, 
UN Doc. A/RES/43/173, See eg. principles 4, 11–14 (right to be heard and to information), 
17–18 (on legal counsel) and 32 (right to challenge the lawfulness of detention).
137 For an overview of case-law on this issue see “Guide on Article 5 of the Convention, Right 
to Liberty and Security”, ECtHR, April 2014, <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Guide_Art_5_ENG.pdf>, pp. 4–5. On different forms of restrictions amounting to depriva-
tion of liberty in the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee see also General 
Comment No. 35, ccpr, para. 5.
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best practices on how to meet these difficulties, while respecting international 
human rights standards, including in relation to privacy and fair trial rights.
States must ensure that they do not co-operate with other states in the 
transfer of persons, or the collection, sharing or receipt of information and evi-
dence, in a way that violates their own obligations or aids and assists wrongs by 
other states.138 unsc Resolution 2396 (2017) raises particular concerns given 
the emphasis on gathering and sharing of information, intelligence and evi-
dence, including personal biometric data with other states.139 unsc Resolu-
tions 2462 and 2482 (2019) go a little further, call on states to ‘intensify and ac-
celerate’ the exchange of relevant ‘operational information or financial 
intelligence’ regarding ftfs, including ‘information obtained from the private 
sector.’140 The same resolution specifically calls on states to periodically assess 
which non-profit organisations may be “vulnerable to terrorist financing” 
which, in this context, may increase the risk that such laws have been shown to 
pose to civil society.141
Cooperation arrangements should be based on national legislation that out-
lines clear parameters and safeguards for the collection and receipt of infor-
mation consistently with ihrl standards and seeks to ensure that information 
provided to other states is not used for unlawful purposes.142 Before entering 
into an information and intelligence sharing agreement, an assessment should 
be made of the counterpart’s record on human rights and data protection, as 
well as the legal safeguards and institutional controls.143
138 Art 16 ilc Articles.
139 Ibid., Ní Aoláin notes that “the principle of sharing assumes that all states value privacy 
equally; do not misuse information to target individuals outside of the rule of law; and 
that information practices including integrity, anonymity, destruction as appropriate are 
rule of law based…. [which is] not the case in practice.”
140 S/Res 2462 (2019); see also UN Doc S/Res/2484 (2019).
141 Ibid. see also The Massive Perils of the Latest UN SC resolution on Terrorism, F. NiAo-
lian, Just Security, 8 July 2019, at https://www.justsecurity.org/64840/the-massive-perils 
-of-the-latest-u-n-resolution-on-terrorism/.
142 The reliance on torture evidence has been considered to amount to a “flagrant denial of 
justice” by the ECtHR; see, for example: Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, ECtHR, Judg-
ment of 24 July 2014. See also UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/60, 10 April 2014, para. 21.
143 See: UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, Report to the UN Human Rights Council 
(“Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that 
ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, in-
cluding on their oversight”), UN Doc. A/HRC/14/46, 17 May 2010, Practices 31–32. See also: 
“Democratic and effective oversight of national security services”, Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, May 2015, in particular recommendation 5.
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6 Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism that Leads to 
Terrorism
There can be no doubt that States are obliged to take effective measures to 
protect individuals within their jurisdiction from violence. This includes pre-
vention of terrorism, and countering recruitment to organizations that threat-
en human rights. The relevance of this is clear in the context of a growing body 
of reports showing the extent of violations by organizations such as Islamic 
state, as well as the energy and resources expended on its online messaging 
and virtual image to lure vulnerable recruits.144
In practice, the response by many states has been the development of strat-
egies or policies often referred to as countering or preventing violent extrem-
ism (cve or pve). This shadows unsc Resolution 2178 (2014) which “[u]nder-
scores that countering violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, 
include[s] preventing radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of indi-
viduals into terrorist groups and becoming foreign terrorist fighters … and calls 
upon Member States to enhance efforts to counter this kind of violent 
extremism.”145 States need to carefully consider the rights issues arising from 
these programmes, and their effectiveness, in light of mixed practice to date, 
much of which has been criticised as dubious and counter-productive.146
6.1 Preventing Terrorist Violence versus Countering “Radicalization” or 
“Extremism”
First, human rights and rule of law controversies arise regarding the objectives, 
framing and/or focus of policies that counter so-called “radicalization” or “ex-
tremism”. The legality concerns discussed above are particularly pronounced 
in relation to “counter-extremism” measures given the undefined, vague and 
inherently problematic nature of the term.147 The fact that so many political 
and human rights movements in diverse contexts have been considered  radical 
144 See, for example, G. Weimann, “The Emerging role of Social Media in the Recruitment of 
Foreign Fighters”, in ffilb, pp. 77–96.
145 See: osce Ministerial Declaration on verlt, para. 4; osce Ministerial Declaration on 
ftfs.
146 Eg. multiple reports on Prevent in the UK raise myriad issues. Practice to date shows many 
pitfalls with direct and indirect implications for rights such as freedom of thought, con-
science, religion or belief, expression, privacy and equality, as noted further below. See 
more broadly C. Thiessen, Preventing Violent Extremis awhile Promoting Human Rights; 
Toward a Clarified UN Approach’ in International Peace Institute July 2019, pp. 1–8.
147 UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-terrorism, Report to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/40/52, 01 March 2019 para 19 describing extremism as “a poorly 
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and extreme in their time should sound a cautionary note. Yet contemporary 
practice points to overbroad and vague definitions in “anti – terrorism” and 
“anti-extremism” legislation being susceptible to abuse, and used in practice to 
targeted the activities of peaceful opposition groups, civil society and hrds.148 
As a UN Special Rapporteur recently noted, the lack of a specific definition of 
extremism “allows States to adopt highly intrusive, disproportionate and dis-
criminatory measures, notably to limit freedom of expression.”149
A sharp distinction should be drawn between loose notions of extremism 
and ‘violent extremism,’ where there is a proximate relationship between pro-
hibited conduct and unlawful acts, such as incitement to discrimination, hos-
tility or violence, as defined in accordance with international human rights 
standards.150
Moreover, it cannot be ignored that, despite repeated reassertions by the 
UN Security Council, and others that terrorism is not associated with any one 
religion,151 the widespread focus on countering “radicalization” or “extremism” 
often have a discriminatory focus or effect.152 In some contexts, detecting 
“ early signs of radicalization” and suspicious behavior has, in practice, become 
interlinked with identifying more devout religious practice, raising obvious 
human rights issues concerning equality and the right to religious freedom.153
defined concept that has already been used to target civil society and human rights 
defenders.”
148 C. Thiessen, Ibid. See, eg. “Civil Society Recommendations to the Participants of the osce 
Ministerial Council Meeting in Vienna”, Civic Solidarity Platform, December 2017. <www 
.civicsolidarity.org/sites/default/files/recomendations_vienna_2017_3.12.pdf>; F. Ní Ao-
láin, “The UN Security Council, Global Watch Lists, Biometrics and the threat to the rule 
of law”.
149 Ibid.
150 Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to 
Terrorism, osce, pp. 42–43.
151 see eg 2016 osce Declaration on strengthening osce efforts to prevent and counter ter-
rorism, and the “osce Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism”, adopted 7 De-
cember 2002, MC(10).JOUR/2.
152 The UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism noted that strategies to counter violent 
extremism, even if generic on paper, tend to target specific groups considered to be most 
“at risk” ; he stressed that such strategies should not be based on “pre- or misconceptions 
about the groups that are most susceptible to radicalization or violent extremism”. See UN 
Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/65, para. 43.
153 see eg Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that 
Lead to Terrorism, osce, pp. 48–60: “Background Paper: Countering the Incitement and 
Recruitment of Foreign Terrorist Fighters: The Human Dimension”, osce/odihr, UN 
Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/65.
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The inviolability of the right to freedom of thought is likewise jeopardized 
when states focus their counter-terrorism policies on ‘extremist’ beliefs and 
ideologies rather than conduct. It has been noted, moreover, that preventive 
measures with a stigmatizing and discriminatory effect may be counter- 
productive, as they can be used by “violent extremist groups as propaganda to 
undermine these efforts”.154
6.2 Countering Violent Extremism While Protecting Freedom of 
Expression
The clampdown on freedom of expression globally, to which ftf measures 
have contributed, deserves urgent attention. Freedom of expression embraces 
the freedom to express ideas and opinions that “offend, shock or disturb,”155 
the significance of which is captured in the oft-cited judgment of the ECtHR 
which notes that “such are the demands of […] pluralism, tolerance and broad-
mindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’”.156 Although not 
absolute, restrictions on the right must be prescribed by law, pursue one of the 
legitimate aims listed in relevant international standards (namely the protec-
tion of the rights or reputations of others or the protection of national security, 
public order, health or morals), and be necessary and proportionate to fulfil-
ment of those aims.157
In certain circumstances, states are not only entitled to, but may be obliged 
to intervene to limit free speech, notably where it amounts to incitement to 
violence or hate speech.158 However, blocking “extremist” views per se is likely 
to fall foul of legal requirements.159 Human rights courts have also noted the 
need to clearly distinguish between incitement to violence and “hostile”, 
154 “The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a more Effective Response 
to the ftf Phenomenon”, Global Counterterrorism Forum (gctf).
155 Handyside v. The United Kingdom, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 December 1976, para. 49.
156 Ibid.
157 See Article 19 iccpr, Article 19 udhr, Article 10 echr, Article 13 achr. For example Ar-
ticle 19(3) iccpr General Comment No. 34 (Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression), 
ccpr, 12 September 2011, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, e.g., paras. 22 and 34, (hereafter, Gen-
eral Comment No. 34, ccpr, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34).
158 See: Article 20 iccpr; and Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (icerd). Or E.g Belek and Velioglu v. Turkey, ECtHR, 
Judgment of 6 October 2015, paras. 24–27.
159 “Rabat Plan of Action” Appendix in UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report to 
the Human Rights Council (“Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the expert workshops on the prohibition of incitement to national, racial or 
religious hatred”), UN Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, 11 January 2013, see also A. Callamard, 
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“ negative” or “acerbic” comments and criticism,160 or expressions of support 
for a leader of a “terrorist organization”, struggle or liberation.161 Moreover, if 
restrictions are to be justified as necessary and proportionate to national secu-
rity threats, those threats must involve at least a reasonable risk of serious dis-
turbance, not an abstract, hypothetical or remote danger down the line.
6.3 Dialogue, Debate and Credible Alternative Narratives
In recent years there has been recognition, in several contexts including the 
UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism, of the 
importance of fostering and creating platforms for dialogue and discussion: “to 
promote tolerance and understanding between communities, and voice their 
rejection of violent doctrines by emphasizing the peaceful and humanitarian 
values inherent in their theologies”.162 The Plan also makes clear that it is im-
portant to “promote, in partnership with civil society and communities, a dis-
course that addresses the drivers of violent extremism, including ongoing hu-
man rights violations.”163
However, tensions and disconnects emerge from recent practice between 
the focus on fostering debate and engaging in discourse, on the one hand, and 
the undue suppression of freedom of expression in the name of countering 
terrorism, on the other.
Moreover, while states have increasingly engaged in measures directed at 
fostering “alternative narratives” to the ideology advanced by groups such as 
isil, these may lack credibility. The effectiveness of such initiatives is likely to 
depend on who they are delivered by and whether they reflect genuinely open 
“Religion, Terrorism, and Speech in a ‘Post-Charlie Hebdo’ World”, Religion and Human 
Rights, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2015, pp. 207–228.
160 Surek and Ozdemir v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 8 July 1999, para. 61; Erdogdu v. Turkey, 
ECtHR, Judgment of 15 June 2000 Falakaoglu v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 26 April 2005 
(French), para. 35. Incal v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 9 June 1998; Otegi Mondragon v. 
Spain, ECtHR, Judgment of 15 March 2011, para. 54 on negative and hostile criticism.
161 Yalçinkaya and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Judgment of 24 June 2014 (French), para. 34. The 
UN Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment on Article 19, stressed that UK 
and Russian offences such as “encouragement of terrorism” and “extremist activity” as 
well as offences of “praising”, “glorifying”, or “justifying” need to be based on clearly 
 defined law to ensure that they do not lead to unnecessary or disproportionate.
162 “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General”, UN Sec-
retary General, UN Doc. A/70/674, 24 December 2015, para. 49 (e), <www.un.org/en/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/67>, (hereafter, unsg Plan of Action on pve).
163 Ibid., para. 51 (g) Rec 3(7). The paragraph goes on to recommend that states “Address any 
existing human rights violations, as a matter of both legal obligation and credibility”.
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debate or just seek to impose “acceptable” narratives by the state. Disaffect-
ed  returning ftfs could be potentially effective dissuasive voices, yet the 
 dominance of coercive approaches may preclude or limit this. As the Hague- 
Marrakech Memorandum of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (gctf) em-
phasizes, trust is critical164 yet often in short supply, exacerbated by repressive 
initiatives that may target would-be interlocutors.
Policies that single out, and impede support or funding to, religious or belief 
communities and other community groups, are problematic and risk counter-
productivity. Community participation in state initiatives is increasingly 
broadly recognized, but it must be voluntary and guard against pitfalls.165 Gen-
uine empowerment of those best placed to affect change is distinct from the 
instrumentalization sometimes evident is pve and cve measures.166 Caution 
is due not to securitize community engagement for political or intelligence-
gathering purposes for example, and to guard against the potentially harmful 
gendered effect of some of those policies.167 Positive programmes such as the 
osce’s projects “Leaders against Intolerance and Violent Extremism (live)” 
initiative, seek to builds the capacity of leaders in civil society – especially 
youth, women, and community leaders – to mobilize others against violent 
extremism that may lead to terrorism.168
The emphasis on broader “multi-stakeholder” and “public-private partner-
ships” – with leaders of religious or belief communities, schools, academia, 
the  media, the business community, and industry (the “whole of society” 
approach) – has been championed by many for its potentially positive long 
term effect. It is again important to guard against risks, for example that “that 
humanitarian organizations associated with cve/pve programmes be seen 
by  some states and non-state actors as politically motivated and therefore 
164 The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum, Good Practice #1.
165 See: Gilles de Kerchove, “Foreword”, in ffilb.
166 The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum, Good Practice #5.
167 See: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead 
to Terrorism, osce, op. cit., note 73; “Women and Terrorist Radicalization: Final Report, 
osce Secretariat – osce odihr Expert Roundtables”, osce, February 2013, <www.osce 
.org/atu/99919>.
168 The project has been developed and is being implemented by the Action Against Terror-
ism Unit of the Transnational Threats Department in the osce Secretariat in Vienna, 
<https://www.osce.org/secretariat/terrorism>. see also unsc Resolution 2178 (2014), para. 
16, op. cit., note 1. The unsg Plan of Action on pve likewise reflects the importance of 
empowerment of communities, of youth and of women; as does the osce Ministerial 
Declaration on verlt. See unsg Plan of Action on pve, paras. 51–53, op. cit., note 206; 
and osce Ministerial Declaration on verlt, paras. 13, 14, 19 (c) and (h).
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 incapable to carry out a neutral, independent and impartial humanitarian 
action.”169 While experience also points to the importance of educators, social 
service professionals and others, tensions arise through increased imposition 
of ‘reporting’ requirements that limit trust and preclude providing young peo-
ple with the guidance and support associated with effective prevention.170
6.4 Addressing the Conditions Conducive to ftf-related Activity
The importance of understanding and addressing “the conditions conducive 
to the spread of terrorism” has been widely acknowledged in recent years, as 
noted in the introduction.171 The mutually reinforcing relationship between 
effective long-term prevention of terrorism and respect for human rights, de-
velopment and rule of law, was reflected in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy and in many other contexts since, including the UN Secretary Gener-
al’s Plan of Action on pve and osce commitments.172
Understanding and addressing “conditions conducive”173 needs to be based 
on greater evidence of the various “push” and “pull” factors that drive individu-
als towards ftf recruitment, as discussed in section 2. This includes address-
ing underlying human rights problems, social disadvantage, poor educational 
and employment opportunities, and (real or perceived) injustice.174 Acknowl-
edgement of grievances, widespread disillusionment and meaningful engage-
ment with affected individuals and groups, including gender-specific condi-
tions, have been identified as important aspects of comprehensive strategies 
to effectively prevent ftf-related travel and recourse to violence.175 One of the 
169 C. Beerli, “Terrorism, counter-terrorism and international humanitarian law. Statement 
of Christine Beerli, icrc Vice-President at the 17th edition Bruges Colloquium”, icrc, 
20–21 October 2016, <www.icrc.org/en/document/terrorism-counter-terrorism-and 
-international-humanitarian-law>.
170 For concerns in this context see eg “Eroding Trust: The UK’s Prevent Counter-Extremism 
Strategy in Health and Education”, Open Society Justice Initiative, October 2016, (hereaf-
ter, “Eroding Trust: The UK’s Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health and Educa-
tion”, Open Society Justice Initiative). The UN ctitf Guidance 2018, p. 56.
171 unsg Plan of Action on pve, and UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
172 “Ministerial Declaration on Reinforcing osce Efforts to Counter Terrorism in the Wake of 
Recent Terrorist Attacks”, adopted by the osce Ministerial Council in Belgrade on 4 De-
cember 2015, MC.DOC/3/15.
173 unsg Plan of Action on pve, and UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
174 unoct Report July 2017.
175 F. Ní Aoláin and J. Huckerby, “Gendering Counter-terrorism: How to, and How not to:, 
Just Security,” 3 May 2018, <www.justsecurity.org/55670/gendering-counterterrorism- 
to-part-ii/>.
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key challenges ahead appears to be the closing of the gap between rhetoric and 
practice on addressing ‘conditions conducive to terrorism’.
6.5 Disengagement, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
There is broad recognition of the need for a “global, holistic, multidimensional 
and strategic”176 approach to the ftf issue. This commonly involves rehabilita-
tion and reintegration as central elements – at least on paper.177 In practice, 
however, the neglect of the rehabilitation and reintegration dimensions of 
states’ obligations in favour of repressive and punitive approaches has prompt-
ed calls (by e.g. the UN Working Group on mercenaries,178 or the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights179) for states to recalibrate the 
balance of punitive measures and rehabilitation opportunities for returnees. 
Rehabilitation should be an important goal of the criminal justice framework, 
but prison based rehabilitation programmes need to be complemented by 
non-custodial reintegration, and embedded within broader strategies to ad-
dress structural social conditions conducive to terrorism.180 They must reflect 
the gender-specific needs and challenges of “reintegrating women, as well as 
men, back into highly-contested societal contexts”.181
Reintegration and rehabilitation efforts should focus explicitly on “disen-
gagement” from terrorism or violence, rather than more amorphous notions of 
176 UN SC Res 2178; UN Working Group on mercenaries, UN Doc. A/70/330, op. cit., and the 
Annual Report to the 71st session of the UN General Assembly (UN Doc. A/71/318).
177 UN SC Res 2178; 2016 osce Declaration and osce Ministerial Council Declaration on 
verlt, The need for programmes of disengagement, rehabilitation and counselling is rec-
ognized, for example, in the unsg pve Action Plan.
178 In this context, the Working Group also cites emerging good practices in respect of reha-
bilitation and reintegration: see eg report of the UN Working Group on mercenaries on 
the visit to Belgium (UN Doc. A/HRC/33/43/Add.2) on the Danish Aarhus and the Ger-
man Hayat programmes, para. 116. For other contexts, see also: G. Holmer and A. Shtuni, 
“Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative”, United States Institute of 
Peace, March 2017, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/sr402-returning-foreign-
fighters-and-the-reintegration-imperative.pdf.
179 F. Ní Aoláin, “The UN Security Council, Global Watch Lists, Biometrics and the threat to 
the rule of law”.
180 G. Holmer and A. Shtuni, “Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative”, 
p. 12. See also: Chairmanship’s Perception Paper on the 2018 osce-wide Counter- Terrorism 
Conference, pp. 7–9.
181 F. Ní Aoláin and J. Huckerby, “Gendering Counter-terrorism: How to, and How not to – 
Part ii”.
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“de-radicalization” that aim to change ideologies or beliefs.182 Enabling indi-
viduals to disengage and redirect their futures may serve both to reduce any 
threat they pose, and in some cases, to convince others to follow suit. It has 
been suggested that there is a risk that the coercive measures that currently 
dominate will pushing people further into violent extremism as states “tend to 
treat all returnees as high risk, thereby radicalizing those who are low threat 
through unwarranted persecution.”183 As such meeting the challenges of in-
vesting in targeted rehabilitation may be “an important element of a pragmatic 
and reasonable response to the foreign fighter phenomenon [as] the basis for 
a long-term security approach”.184
7 Equality
7.1 Acknowledging Direct and Indirect Discrimination
A human rights based approach is one that recognizes the centrality of the 
right to equality and non-discrimination, and its vulnerability, in responses to 
ftf-related threats and challenges. While it is commonly reflected in interna-
tional commitments that terrorism must not be identified with any ethnicity, 
nationality, religion or belief, many challenges remain to convert these words 
into reality.
The full range of measures – criminal and administrative ones as well as 
preventive – have a disproportionate impact on religious or belief communi-
ties, in particular Muslims and particular ethnic groups. In some cases 
182 On the discussion about de-radicalization vs disengagement in custodial settings, see, for 
example, “Radicalization in detention – the icrc’s perspective”, icrc, 11 July 2016, <www 
.icrc.org/en/document/responding-radicalization-detention-icrc-perspective>; Hand-
book on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicaliza-
tion to Violence in Prisons, (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc), 
2016), p. 71. See also: J.M. Berger, “Making cve Work: A Focused Approach Based on Pro-
cess Disruption”.
183 unoct Report July 2017, p. 5.
184 E. Entenmann, L. van der Heide, D. Weggemans, J. Dorsey, “Rehabilitation for Foreign 
Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities for the Criminal Justice Sector”, Inter-
national Centre for Counter-Terrorism, January 2016, <https://icct.nl/publication/rehabil 
itation-for-foreign-fighters-relevance-challenges-and-opportunities-for-the-criminal-jus 
tice-sector/>, (hereafter, E. Entenmann, L. van der Heide, D. Weggemans, J. Dorsey, “Reha-
bilitation for Foreign Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities for the Criminal 
Justice Sector”).
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 inequality is explicitly enshrined in law,185 though more commonly it arises 
from the way laws are applied in practice, for example, through profiling, and 
distinctions not “objectively justified” but based on stereotypical assumptions 
about religion, age, nationality, gender, ethnic or other background. As noted 
above, policies and programmes to prevent ‘radicalization’ or ‘extremism’ 
clearly have a disproportionate impact on specific religious and ethnic 
groups.186 The common identification of Muslim belief or practice as a risk 
factor in “radicalization” of youth is a clear example, which reinforces the stig-
matization of entire religious groups.187
A targeted approach focused on what individuals do, not on characteristics 
or pre-determined assumptions based on ethnicity, religion or gender, is the 
human rights compliant approach. The positive obligation of the state to pro-
tect individuals from discrimination by third parties should be recognized in 
this context.188 Addressing discrimination is essential for an effective, long-
term response to terrorism and potential ftf-related threats that abides by the 
rule of law.
7.2 Addressing the Gender Dimensions of ftf Dynamics and Challenges
It is increasingly common to note that ftf policies should ensure that re-
sponses to the threats and challenges posed by ftfs are not based on gender 
stereotypes, but on evidence reflecting the varying roles of women and men, 
boys and girls and young adults. The isil recruitment strategy of  targeting 
185 Concerns have been expressed, e.g., about Tajikistan’s 2015 decree reportedly banning na-
tionals under 35 from traveling to the Islamic holy sites of Mecca and Medina to perform 
the annual Hajj pilgrimage. See “‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ Laws, Human Rights Rollbacks 
Under UN Security Council Resolution 2178”, Human Rights Watch, p. 14.
186 See, for example, “Eroding Trust: The UK’s Prevent Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health 
and Education”, Open Society Justice Initiative; UN Special Rapporteur on counter- 
terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/65.
187 “Radicalization” conceptions, such as the conveyor belt or slippery slope arguments, sug-
gesting that there is such a linear path or progression from the adoption of certain 
 religious beliefs to the acceptance of, or indeed willingness to use, terrorist violence are 
disputed and not supported by empirical evidence. For risks of pre- or misconceptions 
about the groups that are most susceptible to “radicalization” or violent extremism, see 
also: UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/65.
188 The UN Human Rights Committee has addressed the positive obligations of states to 
counter discrimination by eg “an educational campaign through the media to protect per-
sons of foreign extraction, in particular Arabs and Muslims, from stereotypes associating 
them with terrorism, extremism and fanaticism”; see: Concluding Observations: Sweden, 
ccpr, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE, 24 April 2002.
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women and girls, has been well documented.189 Despite often erroneous 
gendered assumptions about women as passive actors and victims, rather 
than as agents and potential perpetrators, a significant number of women 
are engaged in ftf-related activity in a range of capacities and with diverse 
motivations.190
Where women commit or make a criminal contribution to violent crimes, 
they must be prosecuted in the criminal justice system in a fair, appropriate 
and non-discriminatory manner.191 Punishment exclusively on the basis of re-
lationships or associations, in particular marital or familial ones, as has 
emerged in practice in some contexts, is controversial in light of the right to 
marry and found a family and freedom of association in ihrl.192 The prosecu-
tion of mothers for sending small amounts of money to children abroad is an 
example of the over-reach of the criminal law with a gendered dimension.193
The diverse roles that women and girls have played as perpetrators of terror-
ist acts should not detract from the fact that many have been subject to egre-
gious human rights abuses, including sexual violence, trafficking and forced 
marriage.194 States should, moreover, be mindful that individuals can be 
189 See for example L. Tarras-Wahlberg, “Promises of Paradise? – A Study on Official isis-
Propaganda Targeting Women”, Swedish Defence University, May 2016, <http://fhs.diva 
-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:942997/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.
190 The range of roles that they have played includes as recruiters, facilitators, supporters, 
and in some (more limited) contexts as fighters. For an analysis of the range of reasons 
see: E.M. Saltman and M. Smith, “‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’. Gender and the isis 
Phenomenon”, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015, <www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon 
.pdf>, (hereafter, E.M. Saltman and M. Smith, “Till Martyrdom Do Us Part”).
191 As referred to earlier in footnote 29, one recent report noted the shift in Dutch, Belgian 
and to some extent German prosecutorial policy towards returnees, which now make lit-
tle or no difference in approaches to prosecution.
192 There have been reports about marriage having been criminalized as “material support” to 
terrorism, for example where the sole evidence was the fact of marriage. See for example, 
“Iraq court sentences 16 Turkish women to death for joining Isis”, the Guardian, 23 Feb-
ruary 2018, < www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/25/iraq-court-sentences-16-turkish 
-women-to-death-for-joining-isis>.
193 Article 16 udhr, Article 23 iccpr.
194 “Technical guide to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and 
other relevant resolutions”, uncted, 2017, <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/08/CTED-Technical-Guide-2017.pdf>. The Report notes: “Women and girls are 
often directly targeted by terrorist groups and subjected to gender-based violence in the 
form of rape, forced prostitution, forced marriage, forced pregnancy, and human traffick-
ing”, see: p. 49. As noted in a report of the UN Secretary-General, sexual and gender-based 
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 considered perpetrators and victims at the same time. The victimisation and 
trauma experienced at the hand of groups such as isil, or as a consequence 
of  being identified with them, risks being diminished by the shift towards 
 security-centric responses. All necessary measures should be taken to hold to 
account those responsible for sexual violence and related crimes and to pro-
vide victims with necessary support. This may include relocation out of con-
flict zones or neighboring countries where they may continue to face abuse, 
and subsequent medical and psychological treatment and rehabilitation. 
 Gender-sensitive training or educational programmes should be provided for 
judges and prosecutors, for border control, law enforcement, prison and pro-
bation service personnel, as well as for social services personnel and others 
dealing with returning ftfs.195
The importance of empowering women, and their role in solutions to effec-
tively address the ftf problem, has increasingly been recognized.196 Converse-
ly, the ongoing nature of violations against women with perceived links to isil 
in Iraq, for example, has been described in recent reports as sowing the “seeds 
… of the next round of inter-communal violence”.197 The relationship between 
equality and security are reflected in the UN Secretary-General’s 2015 Plan of 
Action on pve which notes that it is “no coincidence that societies for 
which  gender equality indicators are higher are less vulnerable to violent 
extremism.”198 At the same time, states should ensure that women are not un-
fairly instrumentalized by states that see gender equality and the women, 
violence has become a standard tool for controlling territory, dehumanizing victims and 
recruiting new supporters. See: UN Secretary General, Report to the Security Council 
(“Conflict-related sexual violence”), UN Doc. S/2015/203, 23 March 2015.
195 Training is critical to understand the gender-specific risks and challenges women in-
volved in or associated with ftf-activities may face, and to victims of sexual and gender-
based violence and their needs.For further recommendations on gender-related aspects 
see also UN ctitf Guidance 2018, pp. 24–26.
196 For example, “Radicalisation and violent extremism – focus on women: How women 
become radicalised, and how to empower them to prevent radicalisation”, European 
Parliament, Study for the Committee on Women’s Rights & Gender Equality, December 
2017, <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596838/IPOL_STU(2017) 
596838_EN.pdf>.
197 “The condemned: Woman and children isolated, trapped and exploited in Iraq”, Amnesty 
International, 17 April 2018, p. 45, <www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/8196/2018/
en/>.
198 unsg Plan of Action on pve, para. 53.
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peace and security agenda merely as tools for national security ends, rather 
than ends in themselves.199
Despite growing recognition on paper, understanding and analysis of the 
complex role of gender in counter-terrorism and ftf policies remains limit-
ed.200 States should seek to better understand the gendered dimensions of 
ftf engagement, including the underexplored role of masculinity in ftf mo-
bilization, and its impact on women and men.201
8 Children’s Rights: Immediate Crisis and the Longer Term
A human rights crisis faces thousands of children who have travelled with their 
families, been born to ftfs abroad or themselves engaged with violent groups 
as a result of ftf travel.202 Many now reportedly find themselves orphaned, in 
situations of detention or extreme vulnerability and subject to egregious viola-
tions including rape, violence and disappearances, as a result of their perceived 
association with isil.203 Boys and girls associated with or affected by ftf trav-
el and return present a host of protection concerns for the international com-
munity in the immediate and longer term. For those who have not travelled, 
the full range of children’s rights may yet be affected, directly and indirectly, by 
199 F. Ní Aoláin and J. Huckerby, “Gendering Counter-terrorism: How to, and How not to – 
Part ii”.
200 For more detailed recommendations on the complex relationship between gender equal-
ity and countering terrorism see UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism, Report to 
the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/64/211, 3 August 2009. F. Ní Aoláin and J. Huckerby, 
“Gendering Counter-terrorism: How to, and How not to”; “Tightening the Purse Strings: 
What Countering Terrorism Financing Costs Gender Equality and Security”, Duke Law 
International Human Rights Clinic and Women Peacemakers Program.
201 See F. Ní Aoláin, “Masculinity, Jihad and Mobilisation”, Just Security, 18 October 2016, 
https://www.justsecurity.org/33624/masculinity-jihad-mobilization/.
202 Some reports suggest that ftfs got younger over time; see for example: L. van der Heide 
and J. Geenen, “Children of the Caliphate: Young IS Returnees and the Reintegration 
Challenge”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, August 2017, <https://icct.nl/ 
publication/children-of-the-caliphate-young-is-returnees-and-the-reintegration- 
challenge/>.
203 B. Wille, “isis’s Other Victims: The world needs a plan to deal with the wives and children 
of the Islamic State’s defeated jihadis”, Foreign Policy, 9 October 2017, <foreignpolicy 
.com/2017/10/09/isiss-other-victims>; “Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency”, 
International Crisis Group, 5 December 2016, <www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/
nigeria/nigeria-women-and-boko-haram-insurgency>. See eg Guns, Filth and isis: Syrian 
Camp Is ‘Disaster in the Making’ ny Times, 3 Sept. 2009.
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the criminal, administrative, investigative and other measures discussed in 
this document.204
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (crc) is the most widely rati-
fied human rights convention, with almost universal ratification by 196 states 
parties.205 The cardinal principle reflected in the crc, and across international 
and regional standards, is that the primary focus should be on acting in the 
“best interest of the child”.206
8.1 Children, Citizenship and Return
It follows that states should not deprive children of citizenship given the pro-
found impact this could have on their future and the protection of their 
rights.207 The range and gravity of threats that children associated with ftfs 
are facing abroad underscores the importance of ensuring that those seeking 
to return should be allowed to do so.208 Some States have indicated that young 
204 They may also directly or indirectly affect children’s rights to freedom of expression and 
religion or belief, family life, social security, education, equality and non-discrimination 
and can have wide-reaching, long-term implications for the full range of children’s civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights.
205 The crc explicitly guarantees all of the above mentioned rights to children and other 
human rights instruments, which contain those rights, equally apply to children. osce 
participating States have decided to accord particular attention to the recognition of the 
rights of the child, including the civil rights and individual freedoms and the economic, 
social and cultural rights of the child; see “Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension of the csce”, adopted by the representatives of the 
participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(csce/osce) on 29 June 1990, para 13. With reference to the crc, osce participating 
States have also committed “to actively promote children’s rights and interests, especially 
in conflict and post-conflict situations”; see “Istanbul Summit Declaration”, adopted by 
the Sixth osce Summit of Heads of State or Government on 19 November 1999, para. 28.
206 Article 3(1) crc. According to Article 1 crc children are defined as persons under 18 years 
of age unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.
207 Article 8 crc provides that parties have to preserve children’s identity, including 
nationality.
208 The rape, enslavement, trafficking, sexual and other abuse of children and young women 
by isil has been recognized in, for example, unsc Resolution 2331 (2016). However, since 
the project of the “Islamic State” collapsed in Iraq, current reports also suggest that chil-
dren are trapped, left orphaned and/or unprotected, in abysmal conditions in idp camps, 
that children are subjected to flagrantly unfair prosecutions leading to, inter alia, the 
death penalty, and scores of children of all ages are being held in detention in Iraq; see for 
example: “At least 100 European isis fighters to be prosecuted in Iraq; most facing 
the  death penalty”, the Independent, October 2017, <www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/middle-east/isis-foreign-fighters-iraq-prosecuted-death-penalty-families 
-mosul-a7987831.html>, reporting 1,400 family members being held in Mosul in late 2017. 
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children, at least, could return, is a good practice that should be built on.209 
Likewise, practical obstacles that impede the ability of children to return, such 
as lack of valid birth certificates or registration or proof of paternity should be 
overcome.210 States should endeavor to ensure that children exposed to ex-
treme vulnerability, such as those who remain abroad in active conflict zones, 
camps for internally displaced people, or detention situations211 receive the 
protection they need.
Upon return, the emphasis should be placed on providing returning chil-
dren with adequate support – medical, psychosocial and educational – to as-
sist their recovery and reintegration, in accordance with the crc.212
8.2 Children, Victimisation and Crime
In counter-terrorism practice, as noted by the United Nations Interregional 
Crime and Justice Research Institute (unicri), the focus appears to have shift-
ed towards seeing children as potential threats, in a way that neglects the “best 
interest of the child” approach.213 The emphasis on potential threats posed by 
See also: “The condemned: Woman and children isolated, trapped and exploited in Iraq”, 
Amnesty International.
209 Belgium and France have repatriated some children. Eg. the Belgian government report-
edly decided at the end of 2017 that children under the age of 10 years with proven ties to 
Belgium would automatically be allowed to return, whereas the situation of children be-
tween 10 and 18 years would be decided on a case by case basis. Practical challenges in the 
repatriation of young children remained however: see T. Renard and R. Coolsaet (eds), 
“Returnees: who are they, why are they (not) coming back and how should we deal with 
them?”, Egmont Institute, p. 38 and 74.
210 N. Houry, “Children of the Caliphate: What to Do About Kids Born Under isis”, Human 
Rights Watch, 23 November 2016, <www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/23/children-caliphate>.
211 See Article 20 crc on special obligations of protection where the child is denied the fam-
ily structure of support. Reports such as Guns, Filth and isis: Syrian Camp Is ‘Disaster in 
the Making,’ N. xx, add to the concern.
212 Article 39 crc requires that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to pro-
mote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any 
form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration 
shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of 
the child.”
213 “Children and counter terrorism”, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Re-
search Institute (unicri), 2016, p. 77, <www.unicri.it/in_focus/files/Children_counter 
_terrorism.pdf>.
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child returnees (i.e., child ftfs and children associated with ftfs) in discus-
sions about the reverse flow of ftfs appears to confirm this shift.214
Without denying children’s agency, or the serious impact their crimes may 
have on their victims, the complex relationship between victimization and 
perpetration must be acknowledged and responses tailored accordingly. The 
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict has recommended that states treat children associated with armed 
groups primarily as victims.215 Especially for children, criminal justice respons-
es should not therefore be the norm, but strictly a last resort,216 with a peda-
gogical orientation for the purpose of rehabilitating children.217 If minors are 
subject to criminal justice, international standards of juvenile justice, which 
apply to individuals under 18 years of age, must be respected.218 Detention 
should be exceptional, as short as possible and with attendant safeguards.219 
214 unsc Resolution 2396 (2017) for its part emphasises the diverse roles that children can 
play, and notes they may be victims and require assistance, but also emphasises the secu-
rity concerns.
215 UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, An-
nual report to the UN Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/19, 29 December 2015, 
para. 65.
216 The Committee recommends as a minimum standard that children under the age of 
twelve should not be considered criminally responsible, while 14 or 16 years is commend-
able. See: General Comment No. 10 (Children’s rights in juvenile justice), UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, paras. 30ff, (hereafter, Gen-
eral Comment No. 10, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child).
217 Article 40 (1) crc; General Comment No. 10, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.
218 see the UN Minimum Standards and Norms of Juvenile Justice: the “United Nations Guide-
lines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency” (Riyadh Guidelines), the “United Na-
tions Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice” (Beijing Rules), 
the “United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty” (Ha-
vana Rules); and the “Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System” 
(Vienna Guidelines). There are various recommendations and general comments of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child and others on juvenile justice; see also Handbook 
on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of 
the Justice System (Vienna: unodc, 2018), <www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-pris-
on-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terror-
ist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf>. There are 
also regional standards of relevance. To discuss these here in detail would go beyond the 
scope of this document.
219 Article 37 (b)–(d) crc. See also: “Chapter 5: Violence against children in care and justice 
institutions” in World Report on Violence against Children, Independent Expert for the 
United Nations Secretary-General’s Study on Violence against Children, October 2006, 
available at <www.unicef.org/violencestudy/reports.html>. p. 218.
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Penalties should be tailored to age and personal circumstances, and life im-
prisonment without the possibility of release and the death penalty being pro-
hibited absolutely for persons under the age of 18.220 Even beyond that age, 
when appropriate, the young age of perpetrators should be a factor in deter-
mining appropriate penalties.221
Relatedly, while recognizing the need for the social support of children, 
such as post-trauma counselling and other assistance, UN Security Council 
Resolution 2396(2017) specifically calls upon states to assess and investigate 
suspected ftfs and their accompanying family members, including children. 
Collection of information for the purpose of carrying out risk assessments, sur-
veillance or to place individuals on watch lists and exchange information be-
tween states are likely to result in invasive interferences with children’s privacy 
and other rights, with detrimental effects on their lives.
While the challenges are considerable, states should take all possible mea-
sures to give meaningful effect to children’s rights. Protecting the rights of the 
child is an important human rights obligation, and converges with broader, 
longer-term security goals.
9 Conclusions
It has long been recognized that states should adopt a human rights and rule 
of law-based approach in all measures aimed at countering the threats and 
challenges posed by ftfs. This reflects recognition of the fact that security 
cannot be achieved at the expense of human rights. The cost of dispensing 
with the rule of law is epitomized by the worst excesses of the ‘war on terror.’222 
The international community responded by committing itself to a different, 
holistic, comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy over a decade ago.
Yet few of the human rights problems and challenges that have arisen in the 
ftf context, and been highlighted in this report, are new. They are the latest 
(but most likely not the last) manifestation of the broader, fundamental prob-
lem of the erosion of the rule of law in the name of counter-terrorism. Defini-
tional deficits, the expanding scope of measures against ill-defined targets 
 under cover of Security Council resolutions, the erosion of judicial oversight 
220 Article 37 (a) crc and Article 6 (5) iccpr.
221 See: General Comment No. 10, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, paras. 37–38.
222 The counter-productivity is recognized prior to the UN Global Strategy, and reflected in 
the apparent shift to a holistic, long term approach, and consistent reference on paper to 
respecting human rights and ihl.
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and due process safeguards, the creeping reach of criminal law to embrace le-
gitimate activity including political opposition and human rights defence, re-
sort to arbitrary detention, or the ‘dark side of international cooperation’ are 
all too familiar in counter-terrorism practice in a post 9/11 world.223 However, 
as is clear from the issues explored in this paper, the osce report upon which 
it is based and many other reports, far from grappling with those problems 
they have been replicated and exacerbated in the context of “foreign terrorist 
fighters”. The ftf responses therefore raise core concerns as to the willingness 
to learn the lessons of the past.
Beyond the particular human rights issues from each of the measures high-
lighted above, there is a cross-cutting, recurring procedural concern. The pro-
cess of adoption of such measures in national systems, and before the Security 
Council, has been criticised as rushed and untransparent, failing to engage rel-
evant actors and to subject to scrutiny and debate proposals that will have 
wide-reaching effect.224 Responding effectively to the threats posed by terror-
ism, including ftfs, requires calm reflection which can be in short supply in 
the face of (national and international) political and public pressure for ever 
“tougher” laws and actions – especially in the wake of terrorist attacks. Demo-
cratic checks and balances have been compromised, and respect for human 
rights and the rule of law marginalized, in the sometimes hasty legislative fren-
zy to deal with problems or be seen to do so.
At the other end of the spectrum, human rights and rule of law-based ap-
proach to address potential threats and challenges of ftfs should also include 
independent review of the impact, implementation and effectiveness of laws 
and policies. The success of counter-terrorism efforts is inevitably difficult to 
demonstrate, but ongoing analysis and regular review is essential to under-
stand and address negative effects on human rights, and to convincingly dem-
onstrate the necessity and proportionality of measures that restrict rights. 
Periodic reviews, and sunset clauses, which require the renewal of the pro-
visions after a specific time, have been recommended to ensure that excep-
tional  powers do not remain in force when no longer necessary and seep into 
normalcy.225
223 Duffy, War on Terror (2015) Chapters 7 (human rights) and 12 (conclusions on and charac-
teristics of the war on terror).
224 See Ni Aolain on the rushed Security Council process, especially for the adoption of 2396 
in December 2017.
225 UN ctitf Guidance 2018, pp. 44–45, and recommendation by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on counter-terrorism, UN. Doc A/HRC/16/51 (“Ten areas of best practice in countering 
terrorism”), Practice 4 (1), paras. 17–20.
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Likewise, independent review, oversight, investigations into potential mis-
conduct, appropriate accountability, and remedies for violations, are all 
 aspects of a human rights and rule of law approach. Acknowledging and ad-
dressing past shortcomings are important for the credibility and legitimacy of 
ftf-related measures. They also represent opportunities for overdue learning, 
for states to identify shortcomings and make adjustments, contributing to poli-
cies that are not only more human rights complaint but also more effective in 
the long-term.
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